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INTRODUCTION
This is a bibliography with a point of view. It takes as a
departure point the U.S. Navy-Marine Corps Maritime Strategy of the
1980s, as enunciated by the civilian and military leaders of the U.S
Government, especially the Department of the Navy. It includes
criticisms of and commentaries on that strategy, as well as items
relating the Maritime Strategy to overall national and allied milita
strategy, and to historical precedents. In addition, it covers both
how the Strategy was developed and who developed it, and the importa
role of wargaming.
The Maritime Strategy has generated enormous debate. All sides
and aspects of the debate are presented here. The focus, however, i
on that Strategy. Absent are discussions of naval affairs which do
have as their points of departure—explicitly or implicitly—the
contemporary Maritime Strategy debate.
In order to trace the ebb and flow of ideas and events over tin
items are listed chronologically, by occurence or publication date,
rather than merely alphabetically. Authoritative official statement
of the Maritime Strategy are indicated by an asterisk (*). Explicit!
direct commentaries on the Maritime Strategy are indicated by a doul
asterisk (**). The other items listed deal implicitly with various
issues or aspects of the Maritime Strategy or with its immediate
antecedents
.
Publications on Sister Service and Allied contributions to the
Maritime Strategy are listed separately, to aid the reader/research<
(Admittedly, this and other artifical typological devices run again:
central theme of the Maritime Strategy: its global, "seamless web"
character). Also, only cursory attention is paid to pre-1981 Navy
strategic thinking on global war, a structural shortcoming that can
legitimately be cited as evidence that such thinking was lacking.
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I. MARITIME STRATEGY DEBATES; 1979-1985
American military strategy and its maritime component have been
debated since" the foundation of the republic. Following World War I.I,
maritime strategy concerns centered around peacetime presence,
antisubmarine warfare (ASW) , and the Navy's role in nuclear strike
warfare against the Soviet Union. During the late 1950s and 1960s the
focus shifted to limited war and deterrence through nuclear-powered
ballistic missile submarine (SSBN) operations. In the early 1970s, the
debate centered on then Chief of Naval Operations Elmo R. Zumwalt's
formulation of the "Four Missions of the Navy"—strategic deterrence,
sea control, power projection, and peacetime presence. (A major body
of literature began to be created then on presence). In the mid-1970s,
sea control seemed to dominate discussions.
In 1978, Admiral Thomas B. Hayward became Chief of Naval
Operations. His views on strategy had been heavily influenced by his
experience as Seventh Fleet Commander and Pacific Fleet
Commander-in-Chief in the post-Vietnam environment. Admiral Hayward 's
focus wc s on flexible offensive forward power projection, conducted
globally and in conjunction with allies and sister services, especially
against the Soviet Union and its attacking forces. Much of this was a
return to concepts familiar to U.S. naval officers of the first
post-World War II decade. That era's focus on nuclear strikes,
however, now broadened to encompass a much wider range of options,
primarily conventional.
Admiral Hayward outlined his views publicly in his initial 1979
testimony before Congress, and subsequently in the pages of the
Proceedings . The naval strategic renaissance and the resultant debate
he and others sparked continues to this day, fueled by the statements
and policies of the Reagan Administration, especially its first
Secretary of the Navy, John F. Lehman, Jr., who served from February
1981 to April 1987.
The initial public Maritime Strategy discussion of the early 1980s
had largely taken the form of a debate on the pages of American public
and foreign affairs and national security periodicals. This debate had
focused on two themes: the general forward strategic principles (and
certain highly publicized Norwegian Sea examples) enunciated repeatedly
by Secretary of the Navy John F. Lehman, Jr. and a perceived "Maritime
Strategy versus Coalition Warfare" dichotomy incessantly alleged by
former Under Secretary of Defense Robert Komer and others.
At the same time, however, the staffs of the Chief of Naval
Operations and the Commandant of the Marine Corps — in conjunction
with officers of their sister services and allies — had been tasked to
develop for internal use a detailed description of the Maritime
Strategy component of U. S. national military strategy. This Maritime
Strategy rigorously integrated into one clear, consistent document a
number of long held views of Navy and Marine Corps senior officers,
certain newly refined concepts developed in the fleet and at the Naval
War College, agreed national intelligence estimates, the strategic
principles articulated by Secretary Lehman and other Reagan
Administration officials, and a thoughtful discussion of the variety
and range of uncertainties inherent in the strategy.
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Concepts developed by the Navy's warfare communities and fleets
as well as by Army, Air Force, joint, and allied commanders, were
examined and -incorporated as appropriate. Where inconsistencies
appeared, hard choices were made. Uncertainties and limitations wer<
identified. Properly, the job was spearheaded by the Strategic
Concepts Group on the staff of the Chief of Naval Operations (OP-603
The U.S. Navy-Marine Corps Maritime Strategy was codified
initially in 1982 to focus Navy program development efforts more
tightly. Its basic premises already had been underlying Navy planni
gaming, and exercises. Subsequently, congressional testimony in 198
released an initial edition of the Maritime Strategy to the public
classified revision to the strategy statement was approved by the
Navy's Program Review Committee (chaired by then Vice Admiral Carlis
Trost) in October 1983 and signed and distributed Navy-wide by Admir
James D. Watkins, then Chief of Naval Operations, in 1984.
Various unclassified elements of the strategy began to find th
way into naval affairs journals, especially the Proceedings . Writi
on naval strategy that did not take the Maritime Strategy as a start
point began to fade. By 1985, enough authoritative congressional
testimony, speeches, op-ed pieces, journal articles, and
letters-to-the-editor — penned by senior naval officers and
well-placed civilian commentators — had appeared for the essential
elements of the Maritime Strategy to be accessible to the public.
Public commentary gradually shifted from exegeses on the press
conferences, speeches, and articles of Secretary Lehman and Ambassa<
Komer to discussions on aspects of the actual Maritime Strategy
developed largely by military officers from national and alliance
guidance and approved by civilian leadership.
Promulgation of the Maritime Strategy fostered increasing publi
and government discourse. Within the Navy, the interplay among the
Maritime Strategy, force-level planning, fleet plans and operations
and professional education and training became a governing dynamic,
the open literature, the number of writings on the strategy rose frin
handful of newspaper and journal articles in 1981 to an avalanche o
government documents, books, and articles in 1986, including over
145,000 copies distributed of the Proceedings ' watershed "The Marit
Strategy" January 1986 supplement alone. This quantitative leap was
accompanied by qualitative changes in both the background of the
commentators and the sophistication of their arguments.
Contrary to much uninformed external criticism of the early lSJl
the Maritime Strategy was presented by the Navy as only one—albeit
vital—component of the national military strategy. It was not
presented as a recommended dominant theme of that national strategy,
Also contrary to earlier uninformed criticism, the strategy embodid
the views of unified and fleet commanders as well as Washington
military and civilian planners and Newport thinkers. The Navy
Department and the fleet were now speaking with one sophisticated
to--and increasingly for—the nation and its allies.
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Hayward, ADM Thomas B., "The Future of U.S. Sea Power,"
Proceedings/Naval Review
, May 1979, pp. 66-71; Also Zumwalt, ADM
Elmo R.,^Jr., "Total Force," pp. 103-106; and "Comment and
Discussion:" July 1979, pp. 23-24; August 1979, pp. 87-89;
September 1979, pp. 89-91; October 1979, p. 21; December 1979, p.
88; January 1980, pp. 82-86. (Public debate on the new era of
U.S. Navy strategy begins. Hayward, Zumwalt, Bill Lind, Norman
Friedman, et al . See also Hayward "Posture Statement" testimony
before Congress, 1979-1982.)
Moorer, ADM Thomas H. USN (Ret.) and Cottrell, Alvin J., "Sea
Power and NATO Strategy", in Myers, Kenneth A., NATO: The Next
Thirty Years , Boulder CO: Westview, 1980, pp 223-236. (Detailed
arguments on the necessarily global nature of any major future war
with the Soviets and the need for forward carrier operations off
the Kola, Vladivostok, and Petropavlovsk, by the 1970-1974
Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff and 1967-1970 Chief of Naval
Operations. Arguments against a "swing" strategy from the Pacific
are also echoed in "For Want of a Nail: the Logistics of the
Alliance" by ADM Isaac Kidd USN (Ret.), former U.S. Navy and NATO
commander in both the Mediterranean and the Atlantic, in the same
volume, pp 189-205).
Turner, ADM Stansfield, USN (Ret.) "Thinking About the Future of
the Navy," Proceedings , August 1980, pp. 66-69. Also "Comment and
Discussion": October 1980, p. 101; November 1980, pp. 124-127;
January 1981, p. 77. (ADM Turner questions role of power
projection in general war strategy.)
U.S .Senate, Committee on Armed Services, Ninety-Seventh Congress,
First Session, Nomination of John F. Lehman, Jr., to be Secretary
of the Navy , January 28, 1981, Washington: USGPO, 1981. ("I
think the major need of the Navy today is the establishment by the
President and the Congress of a clearly articulated naval
strategy, first and foremost").
Prina, L. Edgar, "Budget Increases Reflect 'A Major Change in
Naval Strategy'", Sea Power , April 1981, pp 13-22. (Best coverage
of Secretary Lehman's press conference of 3 March 1981, when he
unveiled his "major change". See also page 1 of the Wall Street
Journal, New York Times, Washington Post , and Baltimore Sun , March
4, 1981, and George, James L. "US Carriers—Bold New Strategy",
Navy International , June 1981, pp 330-335. Compare with Hayward
and Moorer/Cottreli pieces above)
.
Hart, Senator Gary, "Can Congress Come to Order?", in Franck,
Thomas, (ed.), The Tethered Presidency , New York: New York
University Press, 1981, pp 242-3. (A call for a national maritime
-only strategy and "obvious and indisputable naval superiority".
The U.S. Navy certainly shares the second goal, but not the first)
Betts, Richard K., Cruise Missiles: Technology, Strategy,
Politics
,
Washington: Brookings, 1981, pp 537-540. (Sees
discussion of carrier penetration of Soviet waters as "peacetime
deterrent rhetoric" about risky "missions that could turn into a
naval Charge of the Light Brigade").
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Carnegie Panel on U.S. Security and the Future of Arms Control,
Challenges for U.S. National Security; Assessing the Balance;
Defense Spending and Conventional Forces; A Preliminary Report,
Part II , Washington: Carnegie Endowment for International Peace
1981. (Chapter 3, pp 99-148, assesses the naval balance and
identifies key issues. No policy recommendations. Comprehensiv<
and even-handed. Unlike the Maritime Strategy, purely
budget-oriented)
.
Lehman, John F., Jr., "Rebirth of a U.S. Naval Strategy,"
Strategic Review , Summer 1981, pp. 9-15. (For more than two
years, the basic Navy public statement on Maritime Strategy. Se|
also Lehman "Posture Statement" testimony before Congress,
1981-1987, especially regarding linkages among operations,
strategy, and programs.)
Zumwalt, ADM Elmo R. , Jr., USN (Ret.) "Naval Battles We Could
Lose", International Security Review , Summer 1981 pp 139-155. (
the 1970-1974 U.S. Navy CNO. Argues for more stress on the U.S.!
jNavy as "geopolitical cavalry" for low-to-middle-level conflict
and for a "distributed force" building program as optimum for th!
full spectrum of naval warfare requirements, including nuclear v\
at sea)
.
Stockman, David, The Triumph of Politics: How the Reagan
Revolution Failed . New York: Harper and Row, 1986, pp 280-281
( Anonymous "experts" ridicule "the theory of 'getting in harm's
way'" in mid-1981 to President Reagan's gullible budget directo:!
Caldwell, Hamlin, "The Empty Silo—Strategic ASW, "Naval War
College Review , September-October 1981, pp. 4-14. (Call for
anti-SSBN operations in Soviet home water bastions.)
Koburger, CAPT C. W. , USCGR, "Pitts' Choice: An Alternative NA')
Strategy for the USA", Navy International , December 1981, pp
730-731. (Like that of Sen. Hart, one of the very few real
examples of a call for a "pure" national maritime strategy, a
position often falsely attributed to proponents of the U.S. Nav
Maritime Strategy).
Ikle, Fred Charles, "The Reagan Defense Program: A Focus on th
Strategic Imperatives", Strategic Review , Spring 1982, pp 11-18
(By the Under Secretary oif Defense for Policy. Especially goc
on administration requirements for naval forces to provide optii
to fight on a variety of fronts).
Kennedy, COL William V., USAR (Ret.), "Tailor Military Strategy
the Economy", Philadelphia Inquirer , 26 May 1982, p 25. (Sees :
Reagan Administration as building a new maritime strategy on tcb
of an old continental strategy. Considers the Soviet Far East
the key Soviet vulnerability for naval forces to exploit).
Record, Jeffrey, and Hanks, RADM Robert J., USN (Ret.). U_.jL
Strategy at the Crossroads , Washington; Institute for Foreign
Policy Analysis, July 1982. (Two different arguments for a sh
to a national maritime strategy, including one by a prominent
Navy strategist of the mid-1970s.)
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Komer, Robert, "Maritime Strategy vs Coalition Defense," Foreign
Affairs , Summer 1982, pp. 1, 124-1, 144. Also Turner, ADM
Stansfiald, and Thibault, CAPT George, "Preparing for the
Unexpected: The Need for a New Military Strategy," Fall 1982, pp.
125-135; "Comments and Correspondence: Maritime Strategies,"
Winter 1982/3, pp. 453-457. (The debate jumps to a wider arena:
Komer vs Turner vs Lehman. Ambassador Komer had been a leading
Carter Administration Defense Department official from 1977 to
1981.)
Vlahos, Michael, "U.S. Naval Strategy: Geopolitical Needs and the
Soviet Maritime Challenge", in Taylor, William J., Jr., e_t al .
(eds.), Strategic Responses to Conflict in the 1980s , Lexington
MA: D.C. Heath, 1984, pp 427-432. (1982 views of a former Naval
War College faculty member. Especially good on late 1970s
internal U.S. Navy strategy debates, and as critique of tying U.S.
naval strategy too closely to the Soviet naval threat. Cf
approach taken by McGruther, cited in Section XI below. This
volume also contains some of Ambassador Komer 's early— and
retrospectively moat lucid
—
arguments, at pp 196-199).
Vlahos, Michael, "Maritime Strategy versus Continental
Commitment," Orbis , Fall 1982, pp. 583-589. (Argues that the two
approaches are not mutually exclusive.)
Posen, Barry A., "Inadvertent Nuclear War?: Escalation and NATO's
Northern Flank," International Security , Fall 1982, pp. 28-54.
(Claims forward U.S. Navy operations in the Norwegian Sea and
elsewhere are a bad thing.)
Zakheim, Dov, "The Unforeseen Contingency: Reflections on
Strategy," Washington Quarterly , Autumn 1982, pp. 158-166.
(Reagan administration maritime strategy in overall military
context, by a Deputy Under Secretary of Defense.
Lehman, John, "Support for Defense is Still Strong", Washington
Post , December 16, 1982, p 23. ("The Navy is working to do its
part in a team effort of forward-based air, land, and naval
power. Navy strategy is part and parcel of the national strategy
of deterrence, not a substitute for it").
Cohen, Eliot A., "The Long-Term Crisis of the Alliance", Forei gn
Affairs, Winter 1982/3, pp 325-343. (A Naval War College faculty
member argues for strengthening the U.S. Navy, creation of a
"Fifth Fleet", global U.S. military focus and increased European
military responsibilities in NATO. Seeks to bridge the
"Atlanticist vs navalist" debate).
Huntington, Samuel P., "The Defense Policy, 1981-1982," in
Greenstein, Fred I. (Ed.), The Reagan Presidency, An Early
Assessment , Baltimore: The Johns Hopkins University Press, 1983,
pp. 82-116. (Initial Reagan overall defense policies and
strategy, the contest of the Maritime Strategy.)
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Glenn, Senator John, Carter, Barry E., Komer, Robert W.
,
Rethinking Defense and Conventional Forces , Washington: Center
for National Policy, 1983. (Two ex-Army officers, Carter, pp
33-35, and Komer, pp 46-48, attack the Maritime Strategy and the
600-ship Navy)
.
Posen, Barry, and Van Evera, Stephen, "Reagan Administration
Defense Policy: Departure from Containment", in Oye , Kenneth A.
Lieber, Robert J. and Rothchild, Donald (eds.), Eagle Defiant :
United States Foreign Policy in the 1980s , Boston: Little Brown
1983, pp 67-104. (Critical of all aspects of Reagan defense
policy and strategy, including offensive conventional warfightir
especially with naval forces. "Overall, a counterof fensive
strategy is a bottomless pit, since it generates very demanding
missions that cannot be achieved without huge expenses, if they
can be achieved at all... a counterof fensive strategy defeats tr
basic purpose of American conventional forces—the control of
escalation." Adovcates a 10-carrier force).
Brown, Harold, Thinking About Sfocional Security: Defense and
Foreign Policy in a Dangerous World , Boulder CO: Westview Press
1983. (By the 1977-1981 Secretary of Defense. Mildly critical
forward carrier operations; more strongly critical of the 600-sl
Navy build-up. See especially pp 100-101, 121-123, 171-187).
Miller, Steven, "The Northern Seas in Soviet and U.S. Strategy"
in Lodgaard, Sverre and Thee, Marek, (eds.), Nuclear Disengagemi
in Europe , London: Taylor and Francis, 1983, pp 117-137.
(Comprehensive analysis, especially of tie-in between U.S. nava
strategy and Reagan administration policy).
Staudenmaier, COL William, USA, "One if by Land - Two if by Sea
The Continental - Maritime Debate", Army , January 1983, pp 30-3
(Opening salvo of the "Carlisle School". A leading Army War
College faculty member contributes to the misperceptions that t
central U.S. naval strategy debate is about Maritime Strategy v
Continental Strategy, and that it is driven solely by budgetary
considerations)
.
U.S. House Armed Services Committee, Ninety-eighth Congress, Fi
Session, Hearings on the Department of Defense Authorization £o
FY84 ; Part 4, Washington: GPO, 1983, pp. 47-51. (COMO Dudley
Carlson publicly unveils a version of the U.S. Navy's "first cu
Maritime Strategy, February 1983. Published later that year.)
Tritten, CDR James J., "It's Not Either Or", Wings of Gold , Spr
1983, pp 49-52. (Argues Mahanian concept of U.S. seapower is
necessary to support U.S. forward defense continental strategy)
Nunn, Senator Sam, The Need to Reshape Military Strategy
,
Washington: Georgetown University CSIS, March 18, 1983, p 7.





Caldwell, Hamlin, "Arctic Submarine Warfare", Submarine Review
,
July 1983, pp 4-13. (Develops further the arguments in his 1981
articled
Dunn, Keith A., and Staudenmaier , COL William 0. , USA, "Strategy
for Survival," Foreign Policy , Fall 1983, pp. 22-41. Also Komer
and Dunn and Staudenmaier letters, Winter 1983-84, pp. 176-178.
(The "Carlisle School" again. Seeks to synthesize all points in
the maritime-continental debate.)
Arkin, William M., "Nuclear Weapons at Sea", Bulletin of the
Atomic Scientists , October 1983, pp 6-7. (Sees U.S. Navy theater
nuclear weapons under development as destabilizing, despite Soviet
theater nuclear naval programs).
Murray, Robert J., "A War-Fighting Perspective", Proceedings ,
October 1983, pp 66-81. (By a former Under Secretary of the Navy
and the first Director of the Naval War College's Center for Naval
Warfare Studies. See especially pp 70 & 74 on the maritime
strategy and the role of the Naval War College. "You hve to
discard the term 'naval strategy', and even the slightly more
modern variant, 'maritime strategy' and talk instead about the
naval contribution to national strategy... Newport is not, of
course, the planning center for the Navy. It is, however, one
place where naval officers get together and try to produce better
ideas" )
.
Epstein, Joshua M., "Horizontal Escalation: Sour Notes of a
Recurrent Theme", International Security , Winter 1983/84, pp
19-31, especially pp 23-25. Also reprinted in Art, Raymond and
Waltz, Kenneth (eds.), The Use of Force (second edition), 1983,
and updated as Chapter 3 of Epstein's Strategy and Force
Planning: The Case of the Persian Gulf , Washington: Brookings,
1987. (Critique of 'Horizontal Escalation', not only as a counter
to a Soviet invasion of Iran, but also apparently as a function of
maritime forces in a global war with the Soviets. Sees
Soviet-Chinese wartime relationship as unaffected by naval
considerations, and regards Soviet ground force numbers as
virtually limitless. No discussion of possible Soviet air force
redeployment, however) .
Record, Jeffrey, "Jousting with Unreality: Reagan's Military
Strategy, " International Security , Winter 1983/84, pp. 3-18. Also
"Correspondence," Summer 1984, pp. 217-221. (Echoes Komer* s and
Turner's stated positions.)
Kaufmann, William W. , The 1985 Defense Budget , Washington:
Brookings, 1984, especially pp 29-34. (A snide critique of U.S.
Navy strategy and force level requests. Naval power projection
forces seen as only needed in Third World areas during a global
war with the Soviets. Unlike the Maritime Strategy, a purely
budget-oriented document). See also Kaufmann chapters in earlier
1982 and 1983 Brookings annuals edited by Joseph Pechman, Setting
National Priorities: 1983 and 1984 , and his 1981 Defense in the
1980s.
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Record, Jeffrey, Revising U.S. Military Strategy; Tailoring Mes
to Ends , Washington: Pergamon-Brassey ' s, 1984. (An argument fcj
a national maritime strategy, but without the offensive forward
operations characteristic of the U.S. Navy Maritime Strategy. i
especially pp 83-86).
Ullman, CDR Harlan, USN (Ret.), Crisis or Opportunity? U.S.
Maritime Industries and National Security , Washington: Georgetc
CSIS, 1984. (Pp 4-7 give a good quick summary of the basic
opposing viewpoints on U.S. naval strategy, eschewing the
extraneous elements usually dragged in by unknowledgeable would
analysts )
.
Kennedy, Floyd D., Jr., "From SLOC Protection to a National
Maritime Strategy: The U.S. Navy under Carter and Reagan,
1977-1984", in Hagan, Kenneth J., (ed.), In Peace and War , (Sec
Edition), Westport CT: Greenwood Press, 1984. (Mostly on
operations and shipbuilding. Sees Secretary Lehman's contribut
as a reorientaticr of national strategy rather than simply an
enhancement of its maritime elements).
Dunn, Keith A., and Staudenmaier, COL William 0., USA, Strategi
Implications of the Continental-Maritime Debate (Washington Pa
#107) , Washington: CSIS, 1984. (Expands arguments made in the
Foreign Policy article.)
Tritten, CDR James J., "Strategic ASW: A Good Idea?",
Proceedings , January 1984, pp 90, 92. (Argues for procuring
anti-SSBN systems without declaring an anti-SSBN policy. See
his "Strategic ASW", Submarine Review , January 1984, pp 52-55,
"The Concept of Strategic ASW", Navy International , June 1984,
348-350).
Lehman, John F., Jr., "Nine Principles for the Future of Americi
Maritime Power," Proceedings , February 1984, pp. 47-51.
(Refinement of Secretary Lehman's thought after three years in
office.
)
Zakheim, Dov s., "The Role of Amphibious Operations in Nations
Military Strategy", Marine Corps Gazette , March 1984, pp. 35-3.
(Deputy Under Secretary of Defense explains Marine missions am
programs in context of overall administration strategy.)
Senate Armed Services Committee, Ninety-eighth Congress, Secon
Session, Hearings on the Department of Defense Authorization f ii
FY85; Part 8 , Washington: GPO, 1985, pp. 3851-3900. (SECNAV 'ji
CNO jointly describe Maritime Strategy as component of nationaj
military strategy, March 1984. Further exposure of the Strate
presented by COMO Carlson a year earlier.)
Rivkin, D.B., "No Bastions for the Bear," Proceedings , April 1
pp. 36-43. Also "Comment and Discussion:" June 1984, pp. 14-1
July 1984, pp. 14-20; August 1974, p. 101; September 1984, p
October 1984, pp. 97-100; January 1985, p. 129, (The anti-SSBfc
mission debate.)
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Turner, ADM Stansfield, USN (Ret.), "A Strategy for the 90s." New
York Times Magazine , 6 May 1984, pp. 30-40, etc. (Argues for focus
on USN Third World intervention role, amphibious warfare, and
more/smaller ships.)
Hamm, Manfred, "Ten Steps to Counter Moscow's Threat to Northern
Europe", Backgrounder (The Heritage Foundation), No. 1356, May 30,
1984. (Calls for rather modest U.S. and allied maritime counters
to a greatly increased Soviet threat).
Perry, Robert, Lorell, Mark A., and Lewis, Kevin, Second-Area
Operations; A Strategy Option (Publication R-2992-USDP) , Santa
Monica CA: Rand Corporation, May 1984. (Pros, cons, rTsks and
uncertainties associated with multi-theater war and "horizontal
escalation". Historical and analytical survey).
Bond, Larry, and Ries, Tomas, "Controversy: A New Strategy for the
North-East Atlantic?" International Defense Review , 12/1984, pp.
1803-4. (USN and NATO naval strategy.
)
* Watkins, ADM James D., "Current Strategy of U.S. Navy," Los
Angeles Times
, 21 June 1984, p. 22 (USN rebuttal to Komer, Robert,
"Carrier Heavy Navy is Waste-Heavy," Los Angeles Times , 16 May
1984, especially to alleged maritime vs. continental and Navy vs.
Europe dichotomies. See also Watkins "Posture Statement"
testimony before Congress, 1983-1986).
Komer, Robert, Maritime Strategy or Coalition Defense , Cambridge,
MA: Abt Books, 1984. Also review by Dr. Dov Zakheim, Political
Science Quarterly , Winter 1984-85, pp. 721-722. (Ambassador
Komer 's last salvo before November 1984 elections, with
administration retort.)
** Brooks, CAPT Linton F., "Escalation and Naval Strategy,"
Proceedings , August 1984, pp. 33-37. Also "Comment and
Discussion:" October 1984, pp. 28-29; November 1984, pp. 18, 24;
December 1984, p. 174. (On Maritime Strategy and nuclear weapons
by an important and articulate contributor to development of the
Strategy. Focus of public debate begins to shift to the Strategy
as it actually is, rather than the Strategy as it is alleged to
be.)
* "Navy Maritime Strategy Moving on Offensive," Navy Times , August
20, 1984, pp. 25-26. (COMO William Fogarty outlines Maritime
Strategy.
)
Stewart, MAJ Richard A., USMC, "Ships That Can Deliver,"
Proceedings , November 1984, pp. 37-43. (Amphibious versus
preposit ioning issues. )
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** George, James L. (ed.), The U.S. Navy: The View From the
Mid-1980s , Boulder, CO: Westview Press, 1985. (Papers delivered
at a Center for Naval Analyses conference, Fall 1984. See
chapters by Dov Zakheim on "Land Based Aviation and Maritime
Warfare," Robert Wood and John T. Hanley, Jr., on "The Maritime
role in the North Atlantic," and "Commentaries," by retired
Admirals Robert Long and Harry Train. Admiral Long's Pacific
Command "Concept of Operations" and his Pacific Command Compaign
Plan were important building blocks for the Maritime Strategy.)
Jampoler, CAPT Andrew, "A Central Role for Naval Forces?... to
Support the Land Battle," Naval War College Review ,
November-December 1984, pp. 4-12. Also "In My View:" March-Apr
i
1985, pp. 96-97; July-August 1985 p. 83. (Mainstream U.S. Navy
thinking.
)
Nagler, VADM Gordon, USN (Ret.), (ed.) Naval Tactical Command an
Control , Washington: AFCEA International Press, 1985. (See the
articles in Chapter III: "Tactical Space Assets" and Chapter IVj!
"EW: A Force Multiplier" on how the U.S. Navy us. t& space and
electronic warfare systems to resolve a variety of operational
problems inherent in implementing the Maritime Strategy)
.
Kaufmann, William W. , The 1986 Defense Budget , Washington:
Brookings, 1985, especially pp. 32-35. (Another sarcastic
Kaufmann budget-oriented critique, including an unduly sanguine
view of allied naval capabilities).
Jenkins, Ronald Wayne, "Coalition Defense versus Maritime
Strategy: A Critical Examination Illustrating a New Approach to
Geopolitical Analysis", unpublished PhD dissertation, Pennsylvan
State University, 1985. (A political geographer's take. Buys
into categorization of "Schools" popularized by Komer, Dunn and
Staudenmaier. Recognizes irrelevance of much of the pre-1984
literature to "real-world" USN planning and programming problem:
Includes a study of the views of Naval War College officers on
geography and Maritime Strategy).
Thomas, CDR Raymond E., "Maritime Theater Nuclear Warfare:
Matching Strategy and Capability", in Essays on Strategy
,
Washington: National Defense University Press, 1985, pp. 39-51,
especially p. 50. (Criticizes U.S. naval strategy for not
addressing theater nuclear warfare adequately; disagrees with
forward carrier operations in high threat areas).
Collins, COL John M., USA (Ret.), U.S. -Soviet Military Balance
1980-1985 , Washington: Pergamon-Brassey ' s, 1985. (Compares
strategy and policy as well as force levels. See especially
Chapter 11. Also Chapters 9, 12, and 16.)
Zimm, LCDR Alan D., "The First Salvo." Proceedings , February IS')
pp. 55-60. Also "Comment and Discussion:" April 1985, p. 16;
1985, p. 132; July 1985, p. 106. (See especially for timing of
forward carrier battle group moves and for Soviet strategy issi
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Klare, Michael T., "Securing the Fire Break," World Policy
Journal , Spring 1985, pp. 229-247. (Sees forward offensive
operations of ships with both nuclear and conventional
capabilities as eroding the firebreak between nuclear and
non-nuclear combat and raising the likelihood of nuclear war)*
Breemer, Jan S., "The Soviet Navy's SSBN Bastions: Evidence
Inference, and Alternative Scenarios," RUSI Journal , March 1985,
pp. 18-26. (Includes useful review of literature
.
)
Ackley, R. T. , "No Bastions for the Bear: Round 2." Proceedings ,
April 1985, pp. 42-47. Also "Comment and Discussion." May 1985,
pp. 14-17, July 1985, p. 112. (More on the anti-SSBN mission.)
Watkins, ADM James D., "Maritime Strategy: Global and Forward,"
Baltimore Sun , 16 April 1985, p. 15. (USN rejoinder to a variety
of critics, especially Record, Jeffrey, "Sanctuary Warfare,"
Baltimore Sun , 26 March 1985, p. 7.)
Ullman, Harlan K., and Et^old, Thomas H. , Future Imperative:
National Security and the U.S. Navy in the Late 1980s .
Washington: CSIS, 1985. (See especially Ullman' s critique of
Maritime Strategy, pp. 20-21, & 67. Contrast with Ullman riposte
to Turner, Proceedings , January 198, p. 77.)
Dunn, Keith A., and Staudenmaier, COL William 0., USA, "The
Retaliatory Offensive and Operational Realities in NATO,"
Survival , May-June 1985, pp. 108-118. (Shows Maritime Strategy
similarities to Samuel Huntington proposals to adopt retaliatory
offensive strategy on the ground and in the air in Europe. Argues
against both.
)
Arkin, William M. and Chappell, David, "Forward Offensive
Strategy: Raising the Stakes in the Pacific", World Policy
Journal , Summer 1985, pp. 481-500. (Forward operations in the
Northeast Pacific seen as "provocative and destabilizing".
Similar in tone and political coloration to Barry Posen 1982
critique of Norwegian Sea operations).
"The Defense Budget: A Conservative Debate", Policy Review ,
Summer 1985, pp. 12-27, especially pp. 20-21 (Prominent
conservatives line up, pro or con, on the 600-ship Navy and the
Maritime Strategy, as they understand it.)
* U.S. House of Representatives, Committee on Armed Services,
** Seapower and Strategic and Critical Materials subcommittee,
Ninety-ninth Congress, First Session. Hearings: The 600-Ship
Navy and the Maritime Strategy , Washington: USGPO, 1986. (June
and September 1985 graphics-laden testimony by the Secretary of
the Navy, the Chief of Naval Operations, the Commandant of the
Marine Corps, and several critics and commentators, notably
retired Admirals Turner and Carroll. With the Proceedings January
1986 Supplement and related "Comment and Discussion" letters, the
most comprehensive public statement and discussion of the Navy's
official views on the Maritime Strategy, although lacking in the
in-depth discussion of uncertainties which charactized internal
Navy Maritime Strategy documents).
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Martin, Laurence, NATO and the Defense of the West , New York:
Holt, Rinehart and Winston, 1985, especially pp. 30-35 ("Flanks")
51-56 ("Warning, Mobilization and Reinforcement"), and 57-67 ( "Th
Maritime Battle"). (Features graphics rivaling those in the
official U.S. Navy Maritime Strategy testimony in their
explanatory power and — often — their complexity)
.
Holloway, ADM James L. Ill, USN (Ret.), "The U.S. Navy—
A
Functional Appraisal," Oceanus , Summer 1985, pp. 3-11.
(Reformulation of pre-Maritime Strategy USN positions by ADM
Hayward's predecessor as CNO. Similar to the Navy's 1978
Strategic Concept of the U.S. Navy (NWP-1). Focus on sea contro]
and on Soviet Navy as anti-SLOC force.)
Friedman, Norman, "U.S. Maritime Strategy," International Defense
Review . 7/1985, pp. 1071-1075. (A prominent civilian naval
affairs commentator analyzes rationale for USN Maritime Strategy
j
* Foley, ADM Sylvester R., Jr., "Strateaic Factors in the Pacific,
Proceedings , August 1985, pp. 34-38. (Retiring PACFLT
Commander-in-Chief discusses his task in context of overall
Maritime Strategy. Shows one component commander's view of the
strategy.
)
Turner, ADM Stansfield, USN (Ret.), "U.S. Naval Policy," Naval
Forces , No III/1985, pp. 15-25. (Update of Turner's thought,
emphasizing amphibious interventions and North Atlantic SLOC
protection.
)
** O'Donnell, MAJ Hugh K. , USMC, "Northern Flank Maritime Offensive
Proceedings , September 1985, pp. 42-57. (USN/USMC global Mariti
Strategy as applied to one region; comprehensive commentary on t
Maritime Strategy debate.) (Also "Comment and Discussion",
October 1985, pp. 16, 20; December 1985, pp. 20-23. See
especially January 1986, p. 19 letter discussing complementary
Norwegian Navy operations; and February 1986, pp. 19-25 letter I
Dr. Norman Friedman elaborating on and endorsing the Maritime
Strategy, and placing it in historical context).
* "NATO Forces Flex Muscles in Norwegian Sea," Virginian-Pilot, 9
September 1985, pp. 1+. (Another fleet view of the strategy.
VADM Henry C. Mustin, U.S. Second Fleet and NATO Striking Fleet
Atlantic Commander, on exercising and implementing Maritime
Strategy in his theater.) See also "Protection of Convoy Route:
Key Objective for Ocean Safari 85," Jane's Defense Weekly , 5
October 1985, pp. 749-753.
** U.S. Navy, First Annual Long Range Planners' Conference; 17-18
September 1985 , Washington: Office of the Chief of Naval
Operations (OP-00K) , 1986. (On relationships among the Maritim
Strategy and U.S. Navy long-range planning, program development
and research) .
Gordon, Michael R. , "Lehman's Navy Riding High, But Critics
Question Its Strategy and Rapid Growth," National Journal , 21







Lehman, John F., Jr., "Talking Surface with SECNAV, " Surface
Warfare , September-October 1985, pp. 2-10. (SECNAV ties the
strategy^ surface warfare, and procurement issues together.)
West, F. J. "Bing", Jr., "Maritime Strategy and NATO Deterrence,"
Naval War College Review , September-October 1985, pp. 5-19. (By a
former Reagan administration Assistant Secretary of Defense, naval
strategic thinker, and principal author of "SEAPLAN 2000," a 1978
progenitor of the Maritime Strategy. Excellent discussion of
conventional protracted war and deterrence concepts underlying the
strategy.
)
McDonald, ADM Wesley, "Mine Warfare: A Pillar of Maritime
Strategy," Proceedings , October 1985, pp. 46-53. (By the NATO
Supreme Allied Commander, Atlantic and Commander-in-Chief of the
U.S. Atlantic Command and the U.S. Atlantic Fleet. Actually on
relationship of Maritime Strategy to NATO fleet strategy in the
Atlantic, with emphasis on mine warfare.)
Harris, CDR R. Robinson, and Benkert, LCDR Joseph, "Is That All
There Is?" Proceedings , October 1985, pp. 32-37. (Surface
combatants and the Maritime Strategy.)
Powers, CAPT Robert Carney, "Commanding the Offense," Proceed ings,
October 1985, especially pp. 62-63. (Central strike warfare theme
of the Strategy is criticized, along with the tactical
organization evolved thus far for its implementation.
)
** Watkins, ADM James D., "The Greatest Potential Problem: Our
National Willpower," Sea Power , October 1985, p. 71. (CNO
describes utility and development process of the Maritime
Strategy.
)
Friedman, Norman, "A Survey of Western ASW in 1985," Internat i onal
Defense Review , 10/1985, pp. 1587-97. (Maritime Strategy and the
North Atlantic ASW campaign: Open ocean vs close-in vs convoy
compaigns.
)
** "Phoenix", "The SSN-21 and U.S. Maritime Strategy" Submarine
Review , October 1985, pp. 27-31. (Discusses linkages between
threat, strategy, and ship design. See also letter by UlmeE f CAPT
D. M., April 1986, pp. 58-60, questioning using estimated Soviet
intentions, vice capabilities, to drive strategy and programs. Cf
McGruther article cited in Section XI below).
* Norton, CAPT Douglas M. , "Responding to the Soviet Presence in
Northern Waters: An American Naval View", in Archer, Clive (ed.),
The Soviet Union and Northern Waters , London: Croom, Helm, 1987.
(A paper presented in October 1985 at Aberdeen, Scotland as part
of the dialogue between U.S. Navy strategists and allied civilian
and military leaders and defense specialists)
.
** Wood, Robert S., and Hanley, John P., Jr., "The Maritime Role in
the North Atlantic," Naval War College Review , November-December
1985, pp. 5-18. (The Naval War College faculty begins to weigh in
heavily in the public debate.)
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** Ullman, CDR Harlan K. , USN (Ret.), "The Pacific and U.S. Naval
Policy", Naval Forces , VI/1985, pp. 36-48. (Sees U.S. Navy
Pacific experience as primary driver of Maritime Strategy.
Especially good as the role of ADM Thomas Hayward as Pacific Fie
Commander, originator of the "Sea Strike" study, and Chief of
Naval Operations).
U.S. House of Representatives, Committee on Armed Services,
Ninety-ninth Congress, First Session, Report of the Seapower and
Strategic and Critical Materials Subcommittee on the 60Q-°Ship
Navy , November 18, 1985, Washington; USGPO, 1986. (The House
Seapower Subcommittee endorses the Maritime Strategy. Essentia]
the same report is in Bennett, Rep. Charles E., "The 600-Ship
Fleet: Is it Necessary?", Naval Forces , 11/1986, pp. 26-38).
Watkins, ADM James D., "Reforming the Navy From Within", Def ens<
85 , November 1985, pp. 18-20. (The CNO on the role of the
Maritime Strategy within the Navy, and its basic characteristic
"We lean heavily on our unified commanders-in-chief and Navy fit
commanders to help strengthen, modernize, and then put into
practice our naval strategy. This plurality of perspective and
the resulting competition of ideas have made for a robust dynam
strategy that recognizes and reflects the complexity of strateg
issues as viewed by all key U.S. military leders worldwide, not
viewed by a parochial naval bureaucracy in Washington").
Bowling, CAPT R.A., USN (Ret.), "Keeping Open the Sea-Lanes,"
Proceedings , December 1985, pp. 92-98. (Argues for a return to
SLOC protection focus for the U.S. Navy.)
Ball, Desmond, "Nuclear War At Sea", International Security
,
Winter 1985-86, pp 3-31. (Argues against anti-SSBN operations i
for more U.S. Navy focus on the escalatory dangers of theater
nuclear war at sea. Not particularly accurate).
Owens, LTCOL MacKubin Thomas, USMCR, "The Hollow Promise of JCS
Reform", International Security , Winter 1985-86, pp. 98-111,
especially pp. 106-109. (Links the strategy debate to the
contemporaneous debate on JCS "reform": "The JCS reorganizatici
debate is really a debate about strategic doctrine." Cf_ Best
Donatelli February 1987 articles, cited below.
Martin, Ben L., "Has There Been a Reagan Revoluation in Defens
Policy?", World Affairs , Winter 1985-86, pp 173-182 (especiall
175-6). (Sees Maritime Strategy as the basis for horizontal
escalation doctrine, and both important only as U.S. Navy budg;i
rationales. "The idea of horizontal escalation itself is too
inherently implausible to find an enduring place in American
strategic doctrine").
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II. THE MARITIME STRATEGY DEBATE; 1986; THE WATERSHED YEAR
In late 1985, Secretary Lehman, Admiral Watkins, and General
Kelley — having ensured that the Maritime Strategy met their
requirements and represented both their thinking and that of their
superiors — submitted manuscripts containing the strategy's basic
tenets — less its uncertainties and limitations — to the Naval
Institute. Following the publication of "The Maritime Strategy," a
special supplement to the January 1986 Proceedings , public
discussion of the strategy took on a new, sophisticated tone, more
relevant to the actual requirements of U.S. national security
decision making. Subsequent statements by President Ronald Reagan,
Secretary of Defense Caspar Weinberger and others confirmed for the
public that the strategy was consistent with higher civilian and
military defense guidance.
In the United States and abroad, discussions ranging from global
warfare with the Soviets to naval history, fleet balance, and
peacetime and crisis operations became suffused with the vocabulary
and concepts of the Maritime Strategy. Much of the writing was now
done by senior military officers. Most notably, a spate of
broad-gauged articles by naval aviation, surface, and submarine
warfare specialists appeared, transcending narrow "unionism."
Knowledgeable civilian strategic thinkers and historians also
offered their cogent commentary on the Strategy.
Proceedings now served as the primary forum, along with the
Naval War College Review , Sea Power , and Naval Forces . The arena,
however, also broadened to include more newspapers and popular
magazines. The public affairs and national security journals
rediscovered the Maritime Strategy, but now in a manner that brought
together not only academics, pundits, and military retirees, but
also serving naval professionals. By 1987, the uniformed naval
officer corps once again — as in the days of Alfred Thayer Mahan or
of the pre-World War II War Plan Orange — had captured the high
ground and catalyzed thinking about the Navy's role in national and
alliance strategy.
* Watkins, ADM James D., "The Maritime Strategy"; Kelley, GEN P.
** X., and O'Donnell, MAJ Hugh, "Amphibious Warfare Strategy"; and
Lehman, John F., Jr., "The 600-Ship Navy"; Proceedings , January
1986 "The Maritime Strategy" Supplement. Also "Comment and
Discussion": February 1986, pp 26-28; March 1986, pp 18-21 by
COL John Collins USA (Ret.) (raises 20 questions); May 1986, p
25; June 1986, p 83 (questions nuclear aspects of the Strategy);
and pp 84-89, by RADM William Pendley (answers Collins 's
questions and elaborates on the Strategy); July 1986, pp 24-27,
(posits significant Soviet forward submarine operations); August
1986, p 10 (still more questions from the insatiable COL
Collins); January 1987, pp 25-30 (argues for new role for PHMs
in the Maritime Strategy; and April 1987, pp 22-27 (another
response to COL Collins by the indefatigable RADM Pendley)).
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** Gordon, Michael R., "Officials say Navy Might Attack Soviet
A-Arras in Nonnuclear War", New York Times , January 7, 1986, p
1. See also (New York) Daily News , Jan 8, 1986, p C-10; The
Oregonian , January 9, 1986, p CIO; Los Angeles Times , January
10, 1986, p 4; Boston Globe , January 11, 1986; New York Times ,
January 12, 1986, p E-l; and The Times (London), February 26,
1986. (Initial press comment on publication of "The Maritime
Strategy" by the Naval Institute. Ignores all strategy issues
except the anti-SSBN operations debate).
* Jervell, Sverre and Nyblom, Kare (eds.), The Military Buildup ir
** the High North: American and Nordic Perspectives , Lanham MD:
University Press of America, 1986. (1985 Harvard conference.
Eliot Cohen, Robert Weinland, Barry Posen, VADM Henry Mustin anc
a number of distinguished British and Nordic officials, military
officers, and thinkers debate the Maritime Strategy and much
else)
.
** Train, ADM Harry, USN (Ret.), "Seapower and Projector Forces",
in American Defense Annual, 1986-1987 , Lexington MA: Lexington
Books, 1986, pp 128-129. (This former Sixth Fleet and Atlantic
Theater Commander updates his views on the Maritime Strategy.
Book also contains routine arguments by Ambassador Komer. More
detailed —and controversial— views by ADM Train can be found
in George, James L. (ed), The Soviet and Other Communist
Navies: The View from the Mid-1980s , Annapolis: Naval
Institute Press, 1986, pp 283-287).
Hughes, CAPT Wayne P., Jr., USN (Ret.), Fleet Tactics: Theory
and Practice , Annapolis: Naval Institute Press, 1986. (By a
Naval Postgraduate School faculty member. Shot through with
important insights on naval strategy and its relationship to
tactics. See especially Chapter 1 on the relationship between
war at sea and war ashore, and Chapter 9 on the relationship
between peacetime and wartime naval missions)
.
Connell, John, The New Magi not Line , New York: Arbor House,
1986, pp 71-81. (Another journalist—this time British—for
whom the strategy debate is largely between Secretary Lehman an
Ambassador Komer, and solely driven by budgetary
considerations. Arguments totally derivative from other
journalists. It would have been news four years earlier).
Archer, Clive and Scrivener, David (eds.), Northern Waters:
Security and Resource Issues , Totowa NJ: Barnes and Noble,
1986. (A series of survey papers focusing on the Norwegian
Sea. See especially Geoffrey Till on Strategy, David Hobbs on
Military Technology, and Steven Miller on Reagan Administration
Strategy. The Miller piece is essentially an update of his 198




. , ana wacnan, James a., concepts, continuity,
and Change", in Cimbala, Stephen, (ed. ) , The Reagan Defense
Program; An Interim Assessment , Wilmington DE: Scholarly
Resources, 1986, pp 1-22. ( Sees Reagan Administration naval
strategy and force planning as derived essentially from concepts
and goals developed by the Navy in the late 1970s)
.
Brzezinski, Zbigniew, Game Plan; The Geostrategic Framework for
the Conduct of the U.S. - Soviet Contest , Boston; Atlantic
Monthly Press, 1986. (Views role of the Navy as one of "Sea
Control" and projecting American power into "distant local
conflicts"/ rather than carrier strikes on "Soviet home ports"
or "strategic nuclear warfare". See pp 183-4, 191-2).
Clancy, Tom, Red Storm Rising , New York: Putnam, 1986.
(Fiction. Wartime Maritime Strategy implemented under
drastically changed assumptions, some plausible and some
fanciful, to suit the storyteller's needs. Soviet fear of
global forward pressure leads to pre-emptive seizure of Iceland,
SSN surge to the Atlantic, but operations are somehow limited to
Central and Northern Europe only. Inherent flexibility and
lethality enables NATO navies to adapt rapidly and successfully,
but with heavy losses). In this vein, see reviews by CAPT David
G. Clark in Naval War College Review , Winter 1987, pp 139-141,
and ADM Thomas B. Hayward, USN (Ret.) in Proceedings , March
1987, p 164. Cf_ Hackett and McGeoch et al
.
, The Third World
War; The Untold Story , cited in Section V below; and Hayes et
al
.
, American Lake , below, Chapter 19, which addresses the
Pacific in a hypothetical global war, although probably not in a
manner in which CAPT Clark or ADM Hayward would agree).
** Hayes, Peter, Zarsky, Lyuba, and Bello, Walden, American Lake:
Nuclear Peril in the Pacific , New York: Penguin, 1986.
(Thorough and extensive analysis of the Maritime Strategy and
much else, but in a shrill, leftist, Australian context. See
especially Chapters 8 and 16, and Chapter 19, a fictional
scenario. They understand that "What appeared a mere budget
battle was in fact a conflict over military strategy").
Daniel, Donald C. , Anti-Submarine Warfare and Superpower
Strategic Stability , Champagne IL: University of Illinois
Press, 1986. (An excellent survey by a Naval War College
faculty member. Concludes that "It seem(s) implausible the U.S.
could so reduce the number of Soviet SSBNs that the U.S.S.R.
might be pushed into using the remainder". See especially pp
151-157).
** West, Francis J., Jr. et al . , Naval Forces and Western Security,
Washington: Pergamon-Brassey ' 3~ 1986. (Contains two essays:
"U.S. Naval Forces and NATO Planning" by West, pp 1-9; and
"NATO's Maritime Defenses" by Jacquelyn K. Davis, James E.
Dougherty, RADM Robert J. Hanks USN (Ret.) and Charles M. Perry,
pp 10-53. West restates his 1985 Proceedings article assertion
that there is a profound divergence between U.S. and West
European perspective, on the purpose and potential contribution
of naval forces in NATO contingency planning, although it is
sometimes difficult to understand which Americans and Europeans
he is talking about. The other essay offers an overview of




Kaufmann, William W. , A Reasonable Defense , Washington:
Brookings, 1986, especially pp 72-92. (Kaufmann' s annual attack
on his own highly personal interpretation of the Maritime
Strategy ,"~ ceding the Mediterranean totally to indigenous allied
naval forces but sailing a major fleet into the Indian Ocean.
Unlike the Maritime Strategy, solely aimed at influencing
legislative budgetary decisions).
Cohen, Eliot A., "Do We Still Need Europe?", Commentary , January
1986, pp 28-35. (A Naval War College faculty member views NATO
flanks and the Far East as of increasing importance. Sees
little utility in discussions of stark strategic alternatives,
e.g. "Europe vs. the Pacific, going it alone vs. having allies,
keeping resolutely to the sea vs. preparing to engage the Red
Army on the continent").
** "Ocean Safari '85: Meeting the Threat in the North Atlantic",
All Hands , January 1986, pp 20-29. (Publicizes close-in convoy
defense, coastal defense, and mine countermeasures aspects of
the strategy, as well as strike warfare and tactical
innovations)
.
** Gray, Colin, "Maritime Strategy", Proceedings , February 1986, pp
34-42. (Supportive commentary by a top-ranked civilian
geopolitician and strategist. Especially helpful in untangling
arguments regarding "horizontal escalation").
* "Message to Moscow: 'Be My Guest': The Navy", Newsweek
,
February 3, 1986, pp 16-17. (VADM Henry C. Mustin on U.S.
Second Fleet implementation of the Maritime Strategy)
.
* U.S. Senate, Committee on Armed Services, Ninety-Ninth Congress;
Second Session, Hearings on the Department of Defense
Authorization for Appropriations for Fiscal Year 1987: Part 1 ,
February 5, 1986, Washington? USGPO, 1986, pp 82-83. (The
Secretary of Defense and the Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of
Staff testify on the budget and, in response to questioning froi
Senator Nunn, on anti-SSBN operations. A key Maritime Strategy
element enunciated by the highest Defense Department officials.
See also Wilson, George C. and Weisskopf, Michael, "Pentagon
Plan Coldly Received" , Washington Post , February 6, 1986, p A14
Weinberger, Caspar, "U.S. Defense Strategy", Foreign Affairs
,
Spring 1986, p 695; and Andrews, Walter, "Weinberger Warns of
'Hollow Strategy'", Washington Times , July 30, 1986, p 4).
* Lehman, John F., "The U.S. Secretary of the Navy: Towards the
600-Ship Fleet", Naval Forces , No. 1/1986, pp 14-23. (Update o
Lehman ' s thought )
.
* "Surface Warfare: What Does The Future Hold?", Annapolis: U.S
Naval Institute Professional Seminar Series Transcript, 12
February 1986, pp 19-20. (RADM Dennis Brooks, COMCARGRU 7, on




U.S. House of Representatives, Committee on Appropriations,
Ninety-Ninth Congress, Second Session, Hearings on the
Department of Defense Appropriations for 1987: Part 1 , February
26, 1986, pp 500-504 and 547-550. (Admiral Watkins and
Secretary Lehman respond to congressional questioning by Rep.
Les AuCoin on the Maritime Strategy. "The decision to go after
an SSBN in time of conflict would be a presidential decision".)
* Watkins, ADM James D. , "Power Projection—Maritime Forces Making
a Strategic Difference", NATO's Sixteen Nations , February-March
1986, pp 102-106. (CNO discusses Maritime Strategy within a
NATO context. N.B. : this annual special issue contains
articles signed by most of NATO's naval chiefs).
** Lapham, Lewis H., "Notebook: Pictures at an Exhibition",
Harper'
s
, March 1986, pp 8-9. (A bizarre, overwritten
exposition on the Maritime Strategy as propaganda and the U.S.
Navy as incompetent)
.
** Ausland, John, "The Silence on Naval Nuclear Arms Should Bt
Broken", International Herald Tribune , March 12, 1986, p 25. (A
critical look at naval theater nuclear weapons and warfare and
the Maritime Strategy)
.
** Reed, Fred, "Soldiering: Navy's Sensitivity Works Against It",
Washington Times , March 27, 1986, p 2. (Criticizes U.S. Navy
explanations of the Strategy as lacking in "strategic
substance", a rather ironic criticism given the author's own
arguments)
.
* Mustin, VADM Henry C, "The Role of the Navy and Marines in the
Norwegian Sea", Naval War College Review , March-April 1986, pp
2-6. (The NATO Striking Fleet Atlantic Commander on U.S. and
NATO Maritime Strategy in the Norwegian Sea). See also "In My
View...", Autumn 1986, pp 101-2).
Landersman, CAPT S. D., USN (Ret.), "Naval Protection of
Shipping: A Lost Art?" Naval War College Review , March-April
1986, pp 23-34. (By a member of the initial U.S. Navy Strategic
Studies Group at Newport. Excellent critique of U.S. Navy
attitudes and practices regarding Naval Control of Shipping
(NCS) as well as Naval Protection of Shipping (NPS), essential
but too-little-discussed aspects of the Maritime Strategy which
are often overshadowed by discussion of concomitant forward
operations. See also his "I am a. ..Convoy Commodore",
Proceedings , June 1986, pp 56-63).
Kennedy, COL William V., USAR (Ret.), "New NE Asian Geography?",
Naval War College Review , March-April 1986, pp 91-92. (An
extreme view of the role of Pacific operations. Calls for a
North Pacific Maritime Strategy to split the Soviet Far East
from the rest of the country at the Urals).
** Doerr, CAPT P. J., "CWC Revisited", Proceedings , April 1986, pp
39-43. (Organizing the Battle Force to implement the Maritime




** Watkins, ADM James D., "Laurels, Accomplishments, and Violent
Peace", Sea Power , April 1986, pp 6-20. (See especially pp
9-10, on the rationale for publishing the Maritime Strategy).
* Kelley, GEN P. X., "The United States Marine Corps Today", Sea
Power , April 1986, pp 82-97. (See especially pp 83-86 for an
overview of the Maritime Strategy from the Commandant of the
Marine Corps perspective)
.
Bagley, ADM Worth H. , USN (Ret.), "U.S. Military Power in the
Pacific: Problems and Prospects", in International Security
Council, National Security in Northeast Asia , New York: CAUSA
Publications, April 13-15, 1986. (Reverses the usual argument
by treating NATO as a "second front threat" diverting the
Soviets from the Far East).
Liska, George, "From Containment to Concert", Foreign Policy ,
Spring 1986, pp 3-23, and "Concert Through Decompression",
Summer 1986, pp 108-129. (U.S. -Soviet rivalry seen as "fed
primarily by its own momentum and, at bottom, by the timeless
asymmetry between land and sea powers". Argues, however, for a
"land-sea power concert" by the two. "The salience of sea-over
land-based power has diminished as the principal maritime power
finds it increasingly difficult to maintain clear naval
superiority" )
.
** "The United States Navy: On the Crest of the Wave", The
Economist , April 19, 1986, pp 49-65. (Strategy and programs).
** Hart, Senator Gary, with Lind, William S., America Can Win: The
**
Case for Military Reform , Bethesda MD: Adler & Adler, 1986, pp
77-81. (Criticizes the Maritime Strategy for its linkages to
the land war in Europe, its early forward focus, and its
relationship to current force structure. Major concern,
however, seems to be with the semantics of the term "Maritime
Strategy").
Ausland, John, C. , Nordic Security and the Great Powers , Boulder
CO: Westview, 1986. (Comprehensive and detailed treatment of
the Maritime Strategy in peace and war within the overall
context of Nordic military security. See especially Chapter 20,
"The Battle for the Norwegian Sea", the author's "climax").
* Hughes, VADM Thomas J., Jr., "Logistics Became Legitimate", Sea
Power , May 1986, pp 17-24, especially p 22. (By the Deputy
Chief of Naval Operations for Logistics. "The logistics of the
Navy are matched to our maritime strategy").
** Ullman, CDR Harlan K., USN (Ret.), "Precept for Tomorrow: A
Busy Agenda Awaits the Next CNO", Sea Power , May 1986, pp
48-51. (Sees a need for the new Chief of Naval Operations to
examine the future maritime environment as well as the reactions





Wettern, Desmond, "Maritime Strategy: Change or Decay", Navy
International , May 1986, pp 304-308. (Endorsement of the
Maritime Strategy by a prominent British naval affairs writer.
Questions, however, whether SLOC interdiction remains as low a
Soviet priority under ADM Chernavin as it did under ADM
Gorshkov)
.
"Bridge Over Troubled Waters", Defense and Foreign Affairs , May
1986, pp 38-9. (On the U.S. Navy's efforts to link technology
and weapons acquisition to the Maritime Strategy).
"Sailing the Cold Seas", Surface Warfare , May-June 1986, pp
6-8. (On the steps being examined and taken to increase U.S.
Navy ability to operate in northern latitudes as required by the
Maritime Strategy).
Williams, CDR E. Cameron, USNR, "The Four 'Iron Laws' of Naval
Protection of Merchant Shipping", Naval War College Review ,
May-June 1986, pp 35-42. (An argument for convoying. Sees the
SLOC protection debate as between convoying and "sanitized
lanes". Oblivious, however, to the debate between either or
both of these options and forward defense, the more topical
issue.) See also "In My View," Naval War College Review , Autumn
1986, pp. 108-109, and Spring 1987, pp. 91-92.
Pendley, RADM William, "Comment and Discussion: The Maritime
Strategy", Proceedings , June 1986, pp 84-89. (This ostensible
response to an earlier "Comment and Discussion" item is actually
an important official amplification of the Maritime Strategy by
the 1985-86 Director of Strategy, Plans, and Policy (OP-60), the
Navy's principal global strategist).
Mather, Ian, "NATO Row Over Boundary Shift", Sunday London
Observer , June 16, 1986. (Sees Secretary of Defense
Weinberger's call for an expanded NATO reach beyond Europe as
derived from the Maritime Strategy).
* Samuel, Peter, "State Dept . , Navy Agree on Opening Pacific Front
in Case of War in Europe", New York City Tribune , 23 June 1986,
p 1. (State Department's Director of Policy Planning espouses
views congruent with the Maritime Strategy, especially regarding
global nature of war with the Soviet Union and early
anti-submarine operations). For an updated version of these
views, see Solomon 1987 article cited below. See also Bedard,
Paul, "Pacific Waters Boil With American and Soviet Warships",
Defense Week , June 23, 1986, p 1; and Elliott, Frank, "U.S.
Looks to Pacific Fleet to Help Europe" and "Soviet Power Grows",




** Epstein, Joshua M., The 1987 Defense Budget , Washington:
Brookings, 1986. (Brookings's annual attack on the Maritime
Strategy. Pp 13, 41-45, and 55-58 reject the Maritime Strategy
as "inefficient and potentially escalatory" and recommend U.S.
Navy force posture cuts accordingly. Sees defense of Norway as
not requiring significant U.S. naval forces. Arguments derived
from Kaufmann, Komer, Posen, and the Congressional Budget
Office. Unlike the Maritime Strategy, a purely budget-driven
document)
.
** Gray, Colin S., "Keeping the Soviets Landlocked: Geostrategy
for a Maritime America", The National Interest , Summer 1986, pp
24-36. (Masterful discussion of the relationships between
geopolitics and the Maritime Strategy)
.
** Wood, Robert and Hanley, John, "The Maritime Role in the North
Atlantic", Atlantic Community Quarterly , Summer 1986, pp
133-144. (Latest incarnation of this oft-reprinted article by
two Naval War College faculty members)
** Polmar, Norman, "The Soviet Navy: Nuclear War at Sea",
Proceedings , July 1986, pp 111-113. See also "Comment and
Discussion", Proceedings , September 1986, p 90. ("The Maritime
Strategy must be challenged for its lack of definition in how w<
are to deter nuclear war at sea").
** Defense Choices: Greater Security with Fewer Dollars ,
Washington: Committee for National Security, 1986. (The
Committee's annual attack on the Maritime Strategy and the
600-Ship Navy. "There is no need to ask the U.S. Fleet to take
on high risk missions close to Soviet shores". Advocates a
"return to a more sensible naval strategy". Unlike the Maritim
Strategy, a purely budget-driven document. This study achieved
a certain notoriety due to its endorsement by Dr. Larry Korb, a
former Reagan Administration defense official and earlier
advocate of a 600-ship Navy).
** Stefanick, Tom, "Attacking the Soviet Sea Based Deterrent:
Clever Feint or Foolhardy Maneuver?", F.A.S. Public Interest
Report , June-July 1986, pp 1-10. (The author seems to lean mor
to the "foolhardy maneuver" persuasion. "The U.S. must reduce
the current emphasis on submarine operations in waters heavily
defended by the Soviet Union." But cf his December article,
below)
.
** Truver, Scott C, "Can We Afford The 15-Carrier Battle Group
Navy?", Armed Forces Journal International , July 1986, pp
74-81. (On the relationship between the Maritime Strategy and
carrier force levels).
O'Rourke, Ronald, "Tomahawk: The U.S. Navy's New Option", Nav;
International , July 1986, pp 394-398. (Good coverage of the
benefits and problems associated with integrating sea-launched
cruise missiles into the Maritime Strategy).
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Ryan, CAPT T. D., "SUBDEVRON TWELVE: In the Global War Games",
Submarine Review
, July 1986, pp 39-40. (Good examples of uses
of Naval War College Global War Games to test the Maritime
Strategy and to identify problems needing new technological and
tactical solutions).
** Winkler, Philippa, "A Dangerous Shift in Naval Strategy",
Oakland Tribune , 7 July 1986. (Decries the Navy's "forward
offensive strategy" for going "beyond legitimate defense
purposes" )
.
Canby, Steven L. , "South Korea's Defense Requires U.S. Air
Power, Not Troops", Wall Street Journal , July 17, 1986, p 24.
(Sees limited utility of Pacific Fleet carriers in a war with
the Soviets. Advocates naval force level cuts).
** O'Shea, James, "U.S. to Sink Billions into New Attack Sub".
Chicago Tribune , July 20, 1986, p 1. (On the role of the SSN-21
Seawolf in the future Maritime Strategy).
Smith, Lee, "How the Pentagon Can Live On Less", Fortune , 21
July 1986, pp 78-85. (See especially p 87. Fortune and
ex-Reagan Administration official Richard DeLauer oppose as
misguided the "Lehman developed" "forward strategy", construed
as carrier strikes on Murmansk, Vladivostok, and
Petropavlovsk) . For more on DeLauer' s negative views, see
"Interview: Richard DeLauer on Defense", Technology Review
,
July 1986, pp 58-67).
* "Maritime Strategy Seminar", Proceedings , August 1986, pp 8-10.
** (Former SACLANT/CINCLANT ADM Wesley McDonald, former
Undersecretary of Defense Robert Komer, former Assistant
Secretary of Defense Bing West, and then-U.S. Second Fleet/NATO
Striking Fleet Atlantic Commander VADM Henry Mustin debate the
Maritime Strategy. For more details, see the excellent Maritime
Strategy Seminar Transcript , Annapolis: U.S. Naval Institute,
1986).
** Polmar, Norman, "600 Ships-Plus or Minus?", Proceedings , August
1986, pp 107-108. The author's views on the relationship
between the Strategy and the 600-Ship Navy force level goals.
"While some would argue with specific components of both the
strategy and the ships that Lehman seeks, it is a coherent and
long-term plan. ..one that Congress has long demanded from the
Navy and the other services").
** Parry, Don, "U.S. Navy's Role in Space", Navy International ,
August 1986, p 477. (Quotes Deputy Assistant Secretary of the
Navy for C^ and Space Ann Berman on the role of space in the
Maritime Strategy).
** Hinge, LT A., RAN, "The Strategic Balance in the Asia-Pacific
Region: Naval Aspects", Journal of the Australian Naval
Insti tute , August 1986, pp 31-50. (Poses important questions
regarding USN force posture requirements in each oceanic
theater, and potential naval roles of Pacific allies, China, and
ASEAN. Very sanguine regarding Western maritime superiority in
the Pacific).
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"Rust to Riches: The Navy is Back", U.S. News and World Report
August 4, 1986, pp 28-37. ( SECNAV John Lehman's influence on
naval strategy seen as paramount).
Isherwood, Julien, "Russia Warns Oslo on U.S. Base", Daily
Telegraph , August 13, 1986. (Cites major Soviet propaganda
offensive against forward battle group operations in the
Norwegian Sea, "the so-called Lehman Doctrine").
"Aircraft Carriers Use Technology, Speed to Stage Vanishing Acts
on High Seas", Baltimore Sun , 17 August 1986, p 16. (Discusses
U.S. Navy countermeasures to Soviet intelligence and targeting
at sea, a key element in carrying out the Maritime Strategy).
Bunting, Glenn F., "Navy Warms up to Idea of Presence in Cold
Bering Sea", Los Angeles Times , 31 August 1986, p 3. (Maritime
Strategy as reflected in increased U.S. Navy peacetime North
Pacific presence).
* Demars, VADM Bruce, "The U.S. Submarine Force", Naval Forces ,
IV/1986, pp 18-30 and "Speech at the Submarine Symposium, Lima,
Peru", Submarine Review , January 1987, pp 5-12. (By the Deputy
Chief of Naval Operations for Submarine Warfare. See especially
pp 20-21 of the former and 8-11 of the latter on the role of
U.S. and allied submarines in the Maritime Strategy: "We dare
not go it alone").
** Drury, F., "Naval Strike Warfare and the Outer Air Battle",
Naval Forces , IV/1986, pp 46-52. (Sees the Maritime Strategy a$
merging the two concepts, which he feels had grown apart, into
one coherent plan to defeat the Soviet air threat).
** Tellis, Ashley J., "The Soviet Navy, Central America and the
Atlantic Alliance", Naval Forces , IV/1986, pp 54-60. (Endorses
the Maritime Strategy for its geopolitical logic, especially
regarding forward operations)
.
* Cropsey, Seth, "Forward Defense or Maginot Line? The Maritime
Strategy and its Alternatives", Policy Review , Fall 1986, pp
40-46. (An excellent restatement of the Navy's arguments by th
Deputy Under Secretary of the Navy for Policy. Particularly
useful on the historical background of the Maritime Strategy).
* Mustin, VADM Henry C, "Maritime Strategy from the Deckplates",
Proceedings , September 1986, pp 33-37. (U.S. Navy Second
Fleet/NATO Striking Fleet Atlantic Commander's positive views o
the utility of the Maritime Strategy to an operational
commander. See also "Comment and Discussion", November 1986, p
14).
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Hampton, LCDR J. P., "Integrated Air Defense for NATO",
Proceedings , September 1986, pp 114-116. (On integrating U.S.
Navy carrier battle groups with U.S. and allied air force
aircraft to counter the Soviet air threat on the NATO Southern
Front: an essential component of the Maritime Strategy too
often overshadowed in the public debate by discussion of the
Northwest Pacific and especially the Norwegian Sea).
** Wood, Robert S., "Maritime Strategy for War in the North",
Journal of Defense and Diplomacy , September 1986, pp 17-20.
(Development of this Naval War College faculty
member/strategist's thought. Stress on combined arms).
** Fouquet, David, "NATO Soldiers March Into Autumn, Testing
Tactics, Equipment, Systems", Defense News , September 15, 1986,
p 14. (The Allies test the Maritime Strategy on the Northern
Front)
.
* Lehman, Hon. John F., Jr., Maritime Strategy in the Defense of
NATO , Washington: CSIS, September 25, 1986. (His 1986 viewsT
"No maritime strategy can be a successful strategy without an
effective land deterrent on the continent of Europe". "The
forward strategy, articulated by the Reagan administration, is
in fact orthodoxy of the oldest sort, conforming precisely to
NATO alliance doctrine". "In summary we have a maritime
strategy in the defense of NATO that is universally accepted by
the maritime forces of Europe and the United States").
** Gray, Colin S., Maritime Strategy, Geopolitics, and the Defense
of the West , New York: National Strategy Information Center,
1986. (An extension of his classic 1977 work on geopolitics,
focusing on implications for U.S. national military strategy.
The footnotes include some excellent rebuttals to the arguments
of Ambassador Komer. A new classic).
** Mearsheimer, John, "A Strategic Misstep: The Maritime Strategy
and Deterrence in Europe", International Security , Fall 1986, pp
3-57. (Despite its biases, distortions, and misleading
discussions of the development of the Maritime Strategy over
time, probably the most important piece of writing critical of
the Strategy to date. Faults the Maritime Strategy for its
"elastic quality", actually regarded by U.S. naval officers as
one of its great deterrent and warfighting strengths. This West
Point graduate and former U.S. Air Force officer's bottom line:
"The key to deterrence is not the Navy, but the forces that will
be fighting on the Central Front. Those forces should be given
first priority when deciding how to allocate defense budgets").
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** Brooks, CAPT Linton, "Naval Power and National Security: The
Case for the Maritime Strategy", International Security , Fall
1986, pp" 58-87. (One of the Strategy's contributors
definitively expands on its basic elements and on its
rationale. Especially useful in discussing the rationale for
anti-SSBN operations and the Strategy's inherent uncertainties,
integral aspects of the Maritime Strategy often slighted in
public official U.S. Navy discussions).
* Schoultz, VADM Robert F. , "Strikef leet : Cost-Ef fective Power",
Armed Forces , October 1986, pp 446-448. (Deputy
Commander-in-Chief, U.S. Naval Forces Europe and former Deputy
Chief of Naval Operations for Air Warfare on the role of the
Carrier Battle Group in the Maritime Strategy).
** Winnefeld, LT James A., Jr., "Topgun : Getting It Right",
Proceedings , October 1986, pp 141-146. (The Navy Fighter
Weapons School seen as a key contributor to the Maritime
Strategy's execution, by the School's training officer, one of
the new generation of navaj. officers for whom the Maritime
Strategy is truly the cornerstone of his profession).
* Weinberger, Caspar, "The Spirit and Meaning of the USS Theodore
Roosevelt", Defense Issues , Vol 1 No 76, November 24, 1986.
(The Maritime Strategy as a component of national military
strategy, by the Secretary of Defense. "The greatest value of
President Reagan's maritime strategy is that it focuses on the
crucial issue of how we can best use our maritime forces and
those of our allies to achieve the basic goal of deterrence --
and deny the adversary his preferred warfighting strategy").
Summarized in Wilson, George, "USS Theodore Roosevelt Joins
Active Service as 15th Carrier", Washington Post , October 26,
1986, p A21; and Matthews, William, "Carrier Theodore Roosevelt
'Charges' to Life", Navy Times , November 10, 1986, pp 33 & 3 7.
** "U.S. Maritime Strategy for the 1980s", Security Digest
,
(The
Wilson Center), November 1986. (CAPT Linton Brooks and Prof.
John Mearsheimer debate the Maritime Strategy).
** Morring, Frank, Jr., "Navy Chief: 'Forward Defense' Doesn't
Mean Kamakazi Missions", Nashua (NH) Telegraph , 26 November
1986. (First reported public discussion of the Maritime
Strategy by the new CNO, ADM Carlisle Trost, with a critique by
Brookings Institution researcher Joshua Epstein).
** Friedman, Norman, "U.S. Strategy and ASW" , Jane's Defense
Weekly , 29 November 1986, pp 1269-1277. (An update of Dr.






"The Future Mix of Subs and Strategy", Proceedings , December
1986, pp 11-12. (The Director of U.S. Navy Attack Submarine
Programs*- the Naval War College Professor of Submarine Warfare,
and two noted civilian naval analysts debate the role of the
U.S. submarine force in the Maritime Strategy. For more than
this brief summary, see "The Future Mix of Subs and Strategy",
Annapolis: U.S. Naval Institute Professional Seminar Series, 25
September 1986).
O'Neil, Captain W. D., USNR, "Executing the Maritime Strategy",
Proceedings
, December 1986, pp 3 9-41. (Recommends measures that
the U.S. Navy must take to ensure the continued executablity of
the Maritime Strategy, by keeping the Soviets on the defensive
and improving defense penetration and strike effectiveness).
Stefanick, Tom A., "America's Maritime Strategy — The Arms
Control Implications", Arms Control Today , December 1986, pp
10-17. (Appears to favor the Maritime Strategy more than he did
in July. "The implicit threat to Soviet ballistic missile
submarines during a conventional naval conflict would be likely
to yield an advantage to the U.S. Navy in the conventional
balance at sea... The likelihood of widespread escalation of the
use of nuclear weapons as a direct result of threats or even
attacks on Soviet SSBNs in their home waters appears to be low.")
** "Dossier: U.S. Report", Naval Forces , Vl/1986, p 132. (Alleges
there is current "indecision about what a U.S. maritime strategy
should comprise". A remarkable piece of reportage for October
1986. There's always 10% who don't get the word).
* Matthews, William, "Marines Would Storm by Air, Not Sea if NATO
Attacked", Navy Times , December 1, 1986. (Despite the
misleading headline, an otherwise generally accurate rendering
of the views of the principal USMC global strategist, BGEN
Michael Sheridan, on the role of the Marines in North Norway, as
part of the Maritime Strategy).
** Halloran, Richard, "A Silent Battle Surfaces", New York Times
Magazine , December 7, 1986, pp 60, 94-97. (On the
anti-submarine warfare component of the Maritime Strategy).
** Elliott, Frank, "Exon Says Maritime Plan Could Trigger War",
Defense Week , December 8, 1986, p 16. (Senator Exon opposes the
anti-SSBN aspects of the Maritime Strategy. "There are good
elements in that strategy, but much of it concerns me").
Greeley, Brendan M., Jr., "Third Fleet Increases North Pacific
Operations to Counter Soviet Activity", Aviation Week and Space
Technology , December 22, 1986, pp 28-29. (On VADM Diego
Hernandez and the Third Fleet North Pacific build-up, especially
joint and allied coordination).
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U.S. Navy Appears to Expand Operations in Pacific Ocean", Jane '
s
Defense Weekly , 27 December 1986, pp 1474-1475. (Interview with
VADM Hernandez on new peacetime measures to more successfully
deter war or — should deterrence fail — conduct wartime




III. THE DEBATE CONTINUES; 1987 AND BEYOND
The first half of 1987 saw the Maritime Strategy firmly in place
as an acknowledged vital element of U.S. and allied military
strategy. President Reagan, Defense Secretary Weinberger, Deputy
Defense Secretary Taft, and Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff
Crowe, all publicly cited its importance and utility. Likewise,
James H. Webb, Jr. (John Lehman's successor as SECNAV) , Admiral
Carlisle Trost (Admiral Watkins' successor as CNO), and a number of
other top flag officers provided numerous examples of the extent to
which it had become the common strategic framework of the naval
leadership. Perhaps the best illustration of this phenomenon was,
however, the July 1987 issue of the Proceedings . Therein, the
Maritime Strategy formed the baseline for a wide range of
discussions of specific U.S. and allied peacekeeping and warfighting
issues: by active duty -U.S. Navy junior officers, senior officers,
and admirals; by naval aviators, surface warfare officers,
submariners and a Marine; and by officers concerned with
inter-allied relations, regional strategic objectives, fleet
operations, and weapons system employment and development.
The second half of 1987 and 1988 promise to add yet another
dimension to the discussion: a number of book-length treatments of
the Maritime Strategy and related subjects are scheduled for
publication. That the 1980s saw a long-needed burgeoning of naval
strategic thought, both in the United States and abroad, has become
indisputable. What remains to be seen is what use future
generations of planners, policymakers, and thinkers will make of
this outpouring.
* Reagan, President Ronald, National Security Strategy of the
United States , Washington: the White House, January 1987. (The
framework within which the Maritime Strategy operates. Clear
focus on global, forward, coalition approach, especially vs. the
Soviets. See especially p 19: "U.S. military forces must
possess the capability, should deterrence fail, to expand the
scope and intensity of combat operations, as necessary"; and pp
27-30: "maritime superiority is vital. (It) enables us to
capitalize on Soviet geographic vulnerabilities and to pose a
_
global threat to the Soviet's interests. It plays a key role in
plans for the defense of NATO allies on the European flanks. It
also permits the United States to tie down Soviet naval forces
in a defensive posture protecting Soviet ballistic missile
submarines and the seaward approaches to the Soviet
homeland. . ." )
.
* Weinberger, Caspar W. , Report of the Secretary of Defense to the
Congress on the FY 1988/FY 1989 Budget and FY 1988-92 Defense
Programs , Washington: USGPO, 1987, p 165. (Reconfirms the
Maritime Strategy as a component of declared U.S. national
military strategy. See also Offley, Ed, and Sanger, S.L.
"Backing at Top for Home Port", Seattle Post- Intelligencer ,
April 28 1987, p 1. (SECDEF, in Seattle, "agrees with the Navy's
controversial wartime strategy". SECDEF direction and
endorsement is no flash in the pan).
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*Crowe, ADM William J., "Statement on National Security
Strategy", U.S. Senate, Committee on Armed Services,
One-hundredth Congress, First Session, Hearings on National
Security -Strategy , January 21, 1987, Washington: USGPO, 1987
(forthcoming) . (Solid concurrence in the Maritime Strategy by
the Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff: "In recent years we
have benefited from some excellent conceptual thinking by the
Navy about global maritime strategy—how to phase operations in
a transition from peace to war, clear the way of submarines
opposing military resupply or reinforcement shipping, and use
our carrier battle groups for either offensive strikes or in
direct support of such allies as Japan, Norway, Greece, and
Turkey. It is imperative, of course, to fold these concepts
into our larger military strategy and that is exactly what we
are doing" )
.
Trost, ADM Carlisle, "Looking Beyond the Maritime Strategy",
Proceedings , January 1987, pp 13-16. Also "Comment and
Discussion": July 1987, pp 19-20. (Admiral Watkins ' s success©*
as CNO briefly reaffirms the Maritime Strateoy's fundamentals:
deterrence, forward defense, alliance soliuutity, the global
view, coexistence with other vital components of our national
military strategy, and -- most important — flexibility.
Highlights anti-submarine warfare in particular).
* U.S. Senate, Committee on Armed Services, One-hundredth
Congress, First Session, Hearings on the Department of Defense
Authorization for Appropriations for Fiscal Years 1988 and 1989
Washington DC: USGPO (forthcoming in 1987/8). (Prepared annual
"posture" statements by SECDEF, CJCS, SECNAV, CNO, and other
officials. Also hearings repartee, and responses to questions
for the record. Maritime Strategy permeates the entire Navy
budget legislative process. In addition to those just cited s#<
especially statements by Assistant Secretary of the Navy Melvyn
Paisley, CINCLANTFLT ADM Frank Kelso, and Deputy Chiefs of Nava!
Operations for Surface and Air Warfare, VADMs Joseph Metcalf am
Robert Dunn).
* U.S. Senate, Committee on Armed Services, One-hundredth
** Congress, First Session, Hearings on National Security Strategy
January-April 1987, Washington : USGPO (forthcoming in 1987/8).
(Testimony by administration civilian and military officials,
and by government and non-government defense specialists.
Includes much discussion of the Maritime Strategy. See
especially testimony by ADM Lee Baggett, NATO Supreme Allied
Commander Atlantic and Commander-in-Chief of the U.S. Atlantic
Command )
.
Hendrickson, David C. , The Future of American Strategy , New
York: Holmes and Meier, 1987. (A new and different
perspective. Advocates a scaled-back mix of continental and
maritime strategies and forces. Sees some U.S. naval forces
particularly useful in Third World contingencies, especially
carriers, but would cut back on naval—and air and
ground--f orces he sees as only useful for highly unlikely
forward global operations against the Soviets. Wrongly believe
this includes Aegis cruisers and destroyers).
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** Brooks, CAPT Linton, "Conflict Termination Through Maritime
Leverage", in Cimbala, Steven and Dunn, Keith (eds.), Conflict
Termination, and Military Strategy: Coercion, Persuasion, and
War
, Boulder CO: Westview, 1987. (Actually written a year
before his 1986 International Security article, for a 1985 Naval
War College conference on war termination).
* * Kaufmann, William W., A Thoroughly Efficient Navy , Washington:
Brookings, 1987. (The annual Kaufmann broadside, this time
designed to influence the congressional votes on carrier
construction. See especially Chapter 2, "The Maritime
Strategy" )
.
** Stefanick, Tom A., Strategic Anti-Submarine Warfare and Naval
Strategy , Lexington MA: Lexington Books, 1987.
** Luttwak, Edward N., Strategy , Cambridge MA: Harvard University
Press, 1987, pp 156-164, & 268. (Cursory discussion of the
Maritime Strategy as "nonstrategy" )
.
** Van Cleave, William R. , "Horizontal Escalation and NATO
Strategy: A Conceptual Overview", in E.F Gueritz et al (eds.),
NATO's Maritime Strategy: Issues and Developments , Washington:
Pergamon - Brassey's, 1987. (A leading conservative defense
thinker argues that "the Navy's version of Horizontal
Escalation" — the Maritime Strategy — "fails because it does
not come to grips with the nuclear factor - indeed, it seems to
attempt ignoring it.").
** West, F. J. ("Bing" ), Jr., "The Maritime Strategy: The Next
Step", Proceedings , January 1987, pp 40-49. (By a former
Assistant Secretary of Defense, Naval War College faculty
member, lead author of Seaplan 2000 and U.S. Marine Corps
officer. One of the most important analyses of the Maritime
Strategy by an outside observer to date. Develops further his
1985 and 1986 views, cited in "Contemporary Naval Strategy" and
Section II above, on the relationships between the Strategy and
U.S. /NATO doctrine. Cf, however, actual statements by allied
military leaders in Section V below). See also "Comment and
Discussion": March 1987, pp 14-15; July 1987, pp 19-20, and
August 1987, pp 31-32.
** Gray, Colin S., "Maritime Strategy and the Pacific: The
Implications for NATO", Naval War College Review , Winter 1987,
pp 8-19. (A thoughtful, wide-ranging, and often provocative
article examining linkages, especially between continental and
maritime power, between the European and Pacific theaters, and
between strategic and conventional deterrence. The article is
notable also for the contributions of CAPT Roger W. Barnett, USN




** Solomon/ Richard H., "The Pacific Basin: Dilemmas and Choices
for American Security", Naval War College Review , Winter 1987,
pp 36-43, especially pp 38-39. (The Director of the State
Department Policy Planning Staff updates his June 1986 Naval War
College Current Strategy Forum lecture: "We must be prepared tc
open a second front in Asia").
"From the Editor", Submarine Review , January 1987, pp 3-5.
(Challenges some of the basic strategic concepts of the Maritime
Strategy regarding the employment of SSNs )
.
* Connors, LCDR Tracy, "Northern Wedding '86", All Hands , January
1987, pp 18-26. See also "Cape Wrath Feels Iowa's Fury",
"Nimitz and Northern Wedding", and "Alaska", in same issue.
(VADM Charles R. Larson, Commander Striking Fleet Atlantic: "W*
went north to test tactics designed to support NATO's maritime
strategy of forward defense. I am proud to report those tactic!
worked" )
.
** Thomas, CAPT Walter 'R', USN (Ret.), "Deterrence, Defense, Two
Different Animals", Navy Times , January 26, 1987, p 23.
(Critique of John Mearsheimer ' s Fall 1986 International Securit
article)
** Keller, LT Kenneth C, "The Surface Ship in ASW" , Surface
Warfare , Jan/Feb 1987, pp 2-3. ("Any future ASW conflict, by
necessity, will be fought in accordance with the maritime
strategy". Another of the new generation of naval officers
gets—and passes—the word).
** Doerr, CAPT Peter J., USN (Ret.), "Comment and Discussion:
Large Carriers: A Matter of Time", Proceedings , February 1987,
p 78. (On the "defense within an offense within a defense"
nature of the putative Battle of the Norwegian Sea and, by
implication, other potential wartime operations implementing th
Maritime Strategy globally).
Tritten, CDR James J., "(Non) Nuclear Warfare", Proceedings ,
February 1987, pp 64-70. (By the Chairman of the National
Security Affairs Department at the Naval Postgraduate School.
On the symbiotic nature of nonnuclear and nuclear warfare, at
sea and ashore, under conditions of crisis response, intra-war
deterrence, and warfighting)
.
** Best, Richard, "Will JCS Reform Endanger The Maritime
Strategy?", National Defense : February 1987, pp 2 6-30. ("The
passage of JCS reform will provide a future administration wit
a handle on defense policy that will allow it to override
previous strategic conceptions, including the Navy's maritime
strategy, (which) will come under heavy criticism by those usii
arguments derived from the approach of the systems analysts."
Best decries this since "only the Navy has thought through the
implications of the continuum of operations in a way which wil
not cause civilian populations to shrink in horror").
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** O'Rourke, Ronald, "U.S. Forward Maritime Strategy", Navy
International , February 1987, pp 118-122. (Especially good on
the "complex, interactive relationship" between the Maritime
Strategy and the 600-ship Navy, and on "the issues". Less
useful--because occasionally inaccurate— in tracing the
prehistory and history of the Strategy, probably because of
deficiencies in the public record).
*• Donatelli, Thomas, "Go Navy", The American Spectator , February
1987, pp 31-33. (On the linkages between defense reorganization
and the maritime elements of the national military strategy.
Supports the Maritime Strategy, and fears for its future under
the new Defense Department set-up).
Matthews, William, "U.S. Navy's Exercises in Aleutians
Underscore Pacific Interest Concern", Defense News , February 9,
1987, p 25. (Reprinted as "Marines, Navy Test Amphibious Skills
in Aleutians", Navy Times , February 16, p 27). (The Navy and
Marine Corps practice cold-weather operations to implement the
Maritime Strategy in the North Pacific).
** Lynch, David J., "Maritime Plan A 'Prescription For Disaster'
Educator Says", Defense Week , February 23, 1987, p 12.
(Professor Mearsheimer again, this time at the American
Association for the Advancement of Science).
** O'Rourke, Ronald, "Nuclear Escalation, Strategic Ant i -Submarine
Warfare and the Navy's Forward Maritime Strategy", Washington:
Library of Congress Congressional Research Service, February 27,
1987. (Especially useful for Navy staff officer views).
Wood, Robert, "The Conceptual Framework for Strategic
Development at the Naval War College", Naval War College Review ,
Spring 1987, pp 4-16. (Further development of the views of this
Naval War College strategist/faculty member. His focus is now
on integrated national military strategy and its teaching and
gaming. See also commentary by RADM J. A. Baldwin, President of
the Naval War College, pp. 2-3).
Piotti, RADM Walter T. , Jr., "Interview", Journal of Defense and
Diplomacy , Vol 5 #2, 1987, pp 14-16. (The Commander of the U.S.
Military Sealift Command on global wartime planning for sealift).
** Pocalyko, LCDR Michael, "Neutral Sweden Toughens NATO's Northern
Tier", Proceedings , March 1987, pp 128-130. (By a 1985-86
member of the Strategic Concepts Group (OP-603). On the
interrelationships among Swedish, Soviet, and NATO strategies
and the Maritime Strategy).
** Daskal, Steven E., "Added Sealift Protection in Time of War",
National Defense , March 1987, pp 38-41. (Recommends a variety
of merchant ship self protection measures for wartime, given the
realities of the Maritime Strategy and U.S. /allied force levels)
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** "Analysis: U.S. Carriers", RUSI , March 1987, pp 1+. (Drags out
yet again the false choice between a Continental or Maritime
Strategy as an issue. Claims West Germany "would object
strcngly'-if moves were made to convert the Maritime Strategy
into the U.S.'s general war strategy". It is, in part, and the}
haven't, at all. Cf_ Bonn's actual White Paper 1985 , cited in
Section V below).
** Grove, Eric, "The Future of Sea Power," Naval Forces , 11/1987,
pp 12-28. (Excellent tour d 'horizon , showing where the Maritime
Strategy fits in the context of total world sea power issues
today)
.
* Dunn, VADM Robert F. , "NANiews Interview", Naval Aviation News ,
March-April 1987, p 4. (The Deputy Chief of Naval Operations fo:
Air Warfare comments on "today's maritime strategy in terms of
its effects on Naval Aviation": "Tactical commanders must deal
with the strategy on a day to day basis. From that derives a
new tactical awareness").
Taylor, RADM R.A.K., "BBBG Power: Validated'.", Surface Warfare
,
March/April 1987, pp 2-5, (Testing Battleship Battle Group
warfighting concepts at sea, an important element of the
Maritime Strategy). See also Matthews, William, "Navy Leans to
Battleships With More Cruise Missiles", Navy Times , April 13,
1987, pp 3 7-3 8, and Defense News , April 13, 1987, p 35,- and
Halloran, Richard, "Warship Cleared for Duty off Iran," New Yor
Times , April 12, 1987, p 32.
** "Push Anti-Mine Work, Navy Urged", Defense Week , March 2, 1987,
p 5. (RADM J.S. Tichelman, RNLN, argues that emphasis on
minesweeping "should go hand in hand with the forward strategy"
at a U.S. Naval Institute Seminar on Mine Warfare).
Daggett, Stephen and Husbands, Jo L. , Achieving an Affordable
Defense: A Military Strategy to Guide Military Spending
,
Washington: Committee for National Security, March 10, 1987.
(The annual CNS attack, using the usual W.W. Kaufmann "data" an
arguments. Unlike the Maritime Strategy, solely designed to
influence the U.S. legislative budget process). A summary is
Korb, Lawrence J. and Daggett, Stephen, "A 15-Carrier Navy: Is
it Really Necessary?", Defense News , March 30, 1987, p 27,
reprinted as "15 Carrier Navy Leaves Forces out of Balance",
Navy Times , April 6, 1987, p 32, and criticized by R.C.
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.
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attack).
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"Lehman's plan", including "aircraft carrier battle
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Navy Times
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primarily by seeking it out and destroying it, but by bottling
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U.S. Need?", New York Times , May 31, 1987, p 4-3. (VADM Joseph
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prominent crafters of the Maritime Strategy). Also, see
"Comment and Discussion", August 1987, p 30).
** George, LT James L. , USN (Ret), "INNF", Proceedings , June 1987,
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* *
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Marine Corps to develop an amphibious warfare concept of future
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.
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Allies: Cold Feet on the Northern Flank?", Proceedings
(forthcoming). (By a former member of the OPNAV Strategic
Concepts Branch (OP-603) and contributor to the development of
the Maritime Strategy).
** Cimbala, Stephen J., Extended Deterrence: The U.S. and NATO
Europe , Lexington MA: Lexington Books (forthcoming in 1987).
(Has a thoughtful chapter on the Maritime Strategy and the
Defense of Europe).
** Gray, Colin, The Wartime Influence of Seapower on Landpower: An
Historical Analysis, (forthcoming in 1987).
** Friedman, Norman, The Maritime Strategy of the U.S. Navy:
Concepts and Operations , London: Jane's Publishing Co.
(forthcoming in 1987).
** Daniel, Donald and Wood, Robert, Presuppositions of the Maritime
Strategy , Elmsford NY: Pergamon-Brassey s ( forthcoming in
1987). (By two Naval War College faculty members).
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** Barnett, CAPT Roger, USN (Ret.), Bernstein, Alvin, and Gray,
Colin (eds.), Maritime Strategy; A Textbook (forthcoming in
1987). (Collaboration by a former pre-eminent U.S. Navy
strategisi, a Naval War College Strategy Department head and a
distinguished civilian strategic thinker)
.
** Glaser, Charles L. and Miller, Steven E. (eds.), The Navy, the
Maritime Strategy, and Nuclear War (forthcoming in 1988).
(Examines whether the strategy might cause escalation and the




Ullman, CDR Harlan K., USN (Ret.), U.S. Military Strategy for an
Uncertain Future (forthcoming in 1988)
.
** Hartmann, Frederick, A Force for Peace; The U.S. Navy,
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,
(forthcoming in 1988) . (By a Naval War College
faculty member).
Baer, George W. , Manila Bay to the Norwegian Sea; Dimensions of
U.S. Naval Strategy Since 1890 (forthcoming in 1988). (By a
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IV. SISTER SERVICE CONTRIBUTIONS TO AND VIEWS ON THE MARITIME
STRATEGY
The Maritime Strategy fully incorporates U.S. Navy, Marine
Corps, Coast Guard, Air Force and Army contributions to the global
maritime campaign. In fact, the case can be made that more thought
has been given to actual joint combat operations (as opposed to
problems of command relationships or lift) by the Navy and Marine
Corps in codifying the Maritime Strategy than by either the Air
Force or the Army in developing their own "cornerstone"
publications. The open literature on potential Army contributions
to maritime warfare — such as air defense batteries based in
islands and littoral areas — is particularly weak.
U.S. Joint Chiefs of Staff, Unified Action Armed Forces (JCS
Pub. 2) , Washington: The Joint Chiefs of Staff, December 1986.
( Reflecting the National Security Act of 1947, as amended, The
Goldwater-Nichols Department of Defense Reorganization Act of
1986, Title 10 and Title 32 U.S. Code, as amended, and DOD
Directive 5100.1 (The "Functions Paper"), JCS Pub. 2. governs
the joint activities of the U.S. armed forces. See especially
Chapter II, Sections 1 and 2-3, charging each Military
Department, including the Navy, to "prepare forces ... for the
effective prosecution of war and military operations short of
war". This responsibility (and not —as some critics charge—
a
desire to somehow usurp the authority of the JCS or the Unified
and Specified Commanders) was the primary impetus and
justification for Navy and Marine Corps development,
promulgation, and discussion of the Maritime Strategy. It is the
Navy Department's framework for discharging its responsibilities
to "organize, train, equip and provide Navy and Marine Corps
forces for the conduct of prompt and sustained combat incident
to operations at sea").
U.S. Army, Operations (FM 100-5) , Washington: Department of the
Army, 20 August 1982. ( The Army * s "keystone warfighting manual"
and therefore a building block of the Maritime Strategy. Almost
no discussion of Army-Navy mutual support, however, e.g.: air
defence and island/littoral reinforcement. Included on p 17-7 a
useful discussion of the importance and essentially maritime
nature of the NATO northern and southern European regions.




U.S. Air Force, Basic Aerospace Doctrine of the United States
Air Force (AFM 1-1
)
, Washington: Department of the Air Force,
16 March 1984. (The "cornerstone" Air Force doctrinal manual
and therefore a building block of the Maritime Strategy. Takes
a somewhat narrower view of potential areas of mutual support
than does the Navy. See especially the discussion of objectives
of naval forces on p 1-3, neglecting projection operations, e.g.
strike or amphibious warfare; and pp 2-15, 3-1, and 3-5/3-6,
covering possible Air Force actions to enhance naval operations,
virtually all of which are incorporated in the Maritime
Strategy. Note, however, the lack of mention of any concomitant
naval role in enhancing "aerospace " operations, and the lack of
discussion of USAF AAW contributions to maritime warfare, a key
element of the Maritime Strategy).
Cooper/ Bert H. , Maritime Roles for Land-Based Aviation Report
No. 83-151F), Washington: Library of Congress Congressional
Research Service, August 1, 1983. (Analyzes recent classified
studies, identifies problems and issues, and discusses recent
USN-USAF initiatives).
Wilkerson, LTCOL Thomas, USMC, "Two if By Sea," Proceedings ,
November 1983, pp. 34-39. (On important role of the U.S. Air
Force in Maritime Strategy by the principal Marine Corps
contributor to the Strategy's development.)
Lewis, Kevin N., Combined Operations in Modern Naval Warfare:
Maritime Strategy and Interservice Cooperation (Rand Paper
#6999) , Santa Monica CA: Rand Corporation, April 1984. ~TSee
especially for arguments on alleged unique "Navy Planning
Style", many of which are belied by the Maritime Strategy).
Killebrew, LTC Robert B., USA, Conventional Defense and Total
Deterrence: Assessing NATO's Strategic Options , Wilmington DE:
Scholarly Resources, 1986. (Unique among studies of NATO
defense in its attempt at an integrated discussion of U.S. and
allied land, sea, and air forces. Argues NATO conventional
defense is possible. Advocates early employment of naval forces
as a defensive barrier "guarding" force. Sees a potential role
for carrier air on the Central Front in a protracted war).
Atkeson, MG Edward, USA (Ret.), "Arctic Could Be a Hot Spot in
Future Conflicts", Army , January 1986, pp 13-14. (Fanciful
proposal for expanded U.S. Army role in helping implement the
Maritime Strategy: "An Army air cavalry force, properly
tailored for the mission, should be able to locate submarine
activity under the ice as well as, if not better than, another
submarine" )
.
Alberts, COL D. J., USAF, "U.S. Naval Air and Deep Strike",
Naval Forces , No 1/1986, pp 62-75. (The strike warfare elements




* Pendley, RADM William, "The U.S. Navy, Forward Defense, and the
Air-Land Battle", in Pfaltzgraff, Robert, Jr. et al . (eds.),
Emerging Doctrines and Technologies , Lexington MA: Lexington
Books, forthcoming in 1987. (Official views of the Navy's
Director 6~f Strategy, Plans, and Policy (OP-60) as of April
1986. Argues that Maritime Strategy and Air-Land Battle
doctrine are similar and complementary. Sees both as essential
parts — along with nuclear deterrence — of an "essential
triad" of U.S. defense strategy. A short summary is on pp 15-16
of Emerging Doctrines and Technologies; Implications for Global
and Regional Political-Military Balance: A Conference Report;
April 16-18, 1986 , Cambridge MA: Institute for Foreign Policy
Analysis, 1986. Cf_ Dunn and Staudenmaier May-June 1985 Survival
article; March-April 1986 views of VADM Mustin on linkage
between the Maritime Strategy and "Deep Strike", cited above;
and West German government official views on lack of linkage,
cited in Section V below).
** Kennedy, COL William V., USAR (Ret.), "There Goes the U.S.
Navy—Steaming the Wrong Way", Christian Science Monitor , 2 3
June 1986, p 14. Calls for the Navy to refocus on Asia,
crediting a U.S. Army "counterattack" with having turned the
Maritime Strategy from an alleged early Pacific orientation to a
current European one. Attempts to drive a wedge between the
Navy and Marine Corps, and alleges "only nominal mention of the
Army and the Air Force" in the Proceedings "Maritime Strategy"
Supplement, charges belied by actually reading the Supplement).
** Grace, LCDR James A., "JTC 3A and the Maritime Strategy",
Surface Warfare , July/August 1986, pp 22-24. (On the role of
the Joint Tactical C^ Agency in fielding joint and allied
programs and procedures to ensure implementation of the Maritime
Strategy)
.
Yost, ADM Paul, USCG, "The Bright Slash of Liberty: Today's
Coast Guard: Buffeted But Unbowed", Sea Power , August 1986, pp
8-24. (See especially pp 11-12 and 21-22, on the Maritime
Defense Zones, an important Navy-Coast Guard element of the
Maritime Strategy, by the Commandant of the Coast Guard).
** Builder, Carl H. , The Army in the Strategic Planning Process:
Who Shall Bell the Cat? , Bethesda MD: U.S. Army Concepts
Analysis Agency, October 1986. (A study done for the U.S. Army
to "try to find out why the Army doesn't seem to do very well in
the strategic planning process". Analyzes Army, Navy, and Air
Force strategic planning, especially the Maritime Strategy.
Looks for — and therefore "finds" — differences rather than
similarities. To be revised and reissued as a Rand Corporation
publication in 1987).
Prina, L. Edgar, "The Tripartite Ocean: The Air Force and Coast
Guard Give the Navy a Helping Hand", Sea Power , October 1986, pp
32-45. (Good update on tri-service contributions to
implementing the Maritime Strategy).
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** Fraser, Ronald, "MDZ Mission Defines Coast Guard Wartime Role",
Navy Times , October 20, 1986, p 27. (On the role of the
Maritime Defense Zones).
** Breemer, Jan S. and Hoover, SSG Todd, USAF, "SAC Goes to Sea
with Harpoon", National Defence , February 1987, pp 41-45. (A
history and an update). Cf_ Chipman and Lay article cited in
Section XI below.
Ley, CAPT Michael USA, "Navy Badly Needs to Beef Up Land
Operations Fire Support", Army , May 1987, pp 12+. (Argues for
more large-caliber naval guns to support Army operations ashore)
**
* *
Chipman, Dr. Donald D., "Rethinking Forward Strategy and the
Distant Blockade", Armed Forces Journal International , August
1987, pp 82-88. (Argues for joint integrated USN-USAF wartime
operations in NATO's Northern Region, the GUIK gap, and the
Norwegian Sea. Well in keeping with the Maritime Strategy).
Estep, COL James L., USA, "Army's Role in Joint Global Military
Strategy", Army , August 1987, pp 11+. (Decries "lack of a more
global, jointly oriented strategy" by the U.S. Army and applauds
the Navy's development of same).
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V. ALLIED CONTRIBUTIONS TO AND VIEWS ON THE MARITIME STRATEGY
The Maritime Strategy as developed by the U.S. Navy of the 1980s
is heavily oriented toward combined (and joint) operations, and this
was reflected in the Proceedings January 1986 Supplement, "The
Maritime Strategy". The postwar U.S. Navy had never been
"unilateralist". Allied contributions to the global campaign were
worked out years ago and then had been continually updated in the
drafting of allied war plans, Memoranda of Agreement, and other
documents. They have been routinely discussed at annual
Navy-to-Navy staff policy talks and CNO-to-CNO visits, held between
the U.S. Navy and each of its most important allied associates.
Thus most of the hard bargaining and tradeoffs had already been
done, and integrating allied efforts with the U.S. Navy component of
the Maritime Strategy was not particularly difficult. Once the
Maritime Strategy was drafted, it was briefed to key allied CNOs and
planning staffs and to NATO commanders. Allied feedback was
considered and utilized in updating revisions to the Strategy, and
the process* continues today.
Allied naval strategy — and its relationship to the Maritime
Strategy — is well enough documented. The NATO Information Service
is prolific, and NATO commanders author relevant articles
frequently. Most allied defense ministries publish occasional or
annual "Defense Reports" and/or "White Papers" which sometimes touch
on naval strategy as well as policy and procurement issues. As is
evident from these and other writings, U.S. Navy and allied military
thought is generally congruent.
The North Atlantic Treaty Organization: Facts and Figures (10th
and subsequent editions), Brussels : NATO Information Service,
1981 and subsequently. (The basic official public document on
NATO policy and strategy. See especially latest (1984)
edition, pp 108-111, 143-144 and 380. "The primary task in
wartime of the Allied Command Atlantic would be to ensure
security in the whole Atlantic area by guarding the sea lanes
and denying their use to an enemy, to conduct conventional and
nuclear operations against enemy naval bases and airfields and
to support operations carried out by SACEUR." "NATO's forces
(have) roles of neutralizing Soviet strategic nuclear
submarines, safeguarding transatlantic sea lines, and in general
preventing the Warsaw Pact from gaining maritime supremacy in
the North Atlantic").
Train, ADM Harry, "U.S. Maritime Power", in Coker, Christopher,
U.S. Military Power in the 1980s , London: MacMillan Press, 1983
PP 107-114. (SACLANT provides details on the 1981 NATO Maritime
Concept of Operations (CONMAROPS), one of the building blocks of
the Maritime Strategy).
5-1
Wemyss, RADM Martin LaT., RN, "Naval Exercises 1980-81", Jane'
s
Naval Annual , 1981, pp 151-158. (Highlights problems in
interallied naval cooperation resulting from U.S. Navy
communication and intelligence systems advances)
.
Wemyss, RADM Martin LaT., RN, "Submarines and Anti-submarine
Operations for the Uninitiated," RUSI Journal , September 1981,
pp. 22-27. (Restatement of classic Royal Navy arguments for
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and the Japanese Maritime Self Defense Force in the Northwest
Pacific, and on the deterrent value of same).
** Crickard, RADM Frederick, "The Canadian Navy - New Directions",
Naval Forces , 11/1987, pp 78-87. (Sees the Maritime Strategy as
forcing hard choices on Canadian naval planners. Cf his views
of a year earlier, cited above).
Longbottom, Squadron Leader S.P., RAAF, "Maritime Strike
Strategy for the Royal Australian Air Force", Defense Force
Journa l, March/April 1987, pp 5+. (Argues for increased RAAF
attention to mine warfare).
**
5-9
Department of Defence (Australia), The Defence of Australia:
1987 , Canberra: Australian Government Publishing Service, March
19, 1987.. (The first official Australian Defense "White Paper"
since 1976 ensures continued RAN cooperation within the Maritime
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VI. SOVIET STRATEGY AND VIEWS
U.S. and'allied Maritime Strategy is not a game of solitaire.
The Soviet threat — along with U. S. national and allied interests
and geo-political realities — is one of the fundamental ingredients
of that strategy. No attempt can be made here, however, to recount
the considerable literature that exists on Soviet naval affairs.
The focus in the relatively few works listed below is how the
Soviets view their own maritime strategy as well as ours, and how
correctly we have divined their views. A critical issue is which
missions they see as primary and which they see as secondary, for
their navy and for those of the west, and whether these priorities
will change soon. Much material on the Soviets also can be found in
other entries in this bibliography.
Gorshkov, RADM Serge G. , The Sea Power of the State , Annapolis:
Naval Institute Press, 1979. See especially pp 290 and 329.
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strategy" of Admirals Zumwalt and Turner).
Rumyantsev, RADM A., "The Navy in the Plans of the Pentagon's
'New Military Strategy'", Zarubezhnoye Voyennoye Obozreniye
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Sturua, G. M., "The United States: Reliance on Ocean Strategy."
USA: Economics, Politics and Ideology , November 1982. (A
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conterforce strategy, employing submarine and carrier-launched
nuclear weapons.)
U.S. Senate Armed Services Committee, Ninety-eighth Congress,
First Session. Hearings on the Department of Defense
Authorization for FY84: Part 6 , Washington, GPO, 1983, pp. 2935
and 2939. (RADM John Butts, new Director of Naval Intelligence,
gives authoritative U.S. Navy view of Soviet navy strategy,
April 1983. See also updates in Butts testimony of 1984 and
1985)
.
McConnell, James M. , "The Soviet Shift in Emphasis from Nuclear
to Conventional," Vols I and II, Alexandria, VA. Center for
Naval Analyses, CRC 490, June 1983. (Includes alternative views
of Soviet naval strategy.)
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)
Leighton, Marian, "Soviet Strategy Towards Northern Europe and
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and disquieting similarities" between recent "patterns of Soviet
coercion against northern Europe and Japan").
Office of the Chief of Naval Operations, Department of the Navy,
Understanding Soviet Naval Developments (Fifth Edition),
Washington: USGPO, 1985. (Latest in a series of official U.S.
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Friedman in Proceedings , November 1985, pp 88-89)
.
Sturua, G. , "Strategic Ant i -Submarine Warfare", USA: Economics,
Politics, and Ideology , February 1985. (Strategic ASW viewed as
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"Soviet Naval Activities: 1977-1984", NATO Review , February
1985, pp 17-20. (A series of charts reflecting recent Soviet
exercise activity in the North Atlantic)
.
Bystrov, RADM Yu., "U.S. Games in the World Ocean",
Lite raturnaya Gazeta , September 4, 1985, p 14. (Soviet public
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exercises)
.
Tritten, CDR James J. , Soviet Naval Forces and Nuclear Warfare:
Weapons, Employment, and Policy , Boulder CO: Westview, 1986.
(By the acting Chairman of the National Security Affairs
Department at the U.S. Naval Postgraduate School. Examination
of Soviet naval missions, including implications for U.S. naval
strategy. Anticipates Soviet navy wartime bastion defense,
anti-carrier warfare, strategic anti-submarine warfare,
and—controversially—anti-SLOC operations. See also his




Watson, CDR Bruce W.
, and Watson, Susan M.
,
(eds.), The Soviet
Navy; Strengths and Liabilities , Boulder CO: Westview, 1986.
(See especially chapters by Richard Fisher, "Soviet SLOC
Interdiction", and Keith Allen, "The Northern Fleet and North
Atlantic Naval Operations", which see SLOC interdiction as more
likely than most other knowledgeable experts expect, since
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of protracted conventional conflict).
** George, James L.
,
(ed.), The Soviet and Other Communist Navies:
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ADM Sylvester Foley and ADM Harry Train, two former
"operators". Wayne Wright's "Soviet Operations in the
Mediterranean" is especially good on the interplay of Soviet and
U.S. Maritime Strategy. The excellent paper by Alvin Bernstein
of the Naval War College and and the paper by Anthony Wells have
also been reprinted elsewhere: the former in National Interest
,
Spring 1986, pp 17-29; the latter in National Defense , February
1986, pp 38-44).
Trofimenko, Ginrikh, The U.S. Military Doctrine , Moscow:
Progress Publishers, 1986. (See especially pp 34-36 on Mahan,
geopolitics, and restraining Russia; and pp 193-201 on the
alleged "Blue Water Strategy" of today).
Fitzgerald, CAPT T. A., "Blitzkrieg at Sea," Proceedings
,
January 1986, pp. 12-16. (Argues Soviets may use their navy as a
risk fleet for a "Blitzkrieg," and not for sea-denial. A view
shared by many U.S. Navy operators.)
** Falin, Valentin, "Back to the Stone Age", Izvest ia , January
23/24, 1986, pp 5/5. (A top Kremlin spokesman takes the
Maritime Strategy to task as being "remarkably odious": "It is
hardly possible to imagine anything worse". Highlights opposing
arguments by Barry Posen). See also commentary by Manthorpe,
CAPT William, USN (Ret.), "The Soviet View: The Soviet Union
Reacts", Proceedings , April 1986, p 111.
Petersen, Charles C, "Strategic Lessons of the Recent Soviet
Naval Exercise", National Defense , February 1986, pp 32-36. (A
leading strategy analyst at the Center for Naval Analyses sees
Soviets' strategy threatening U.S. ports and SLOCs in addition
to defending SSBNs close to their homeland. Urges USN strategic
homeporting, mine warfare, and shallow-water ASW initiatives, in
addition to "carrying the fight to the enemy").
** Friedman, Norman, "Soviet Naval Aviation", Naval Forces .
No. 1/1986, pp 92-97. (Sees Soviet Naval Aviation as perhaps
the greatest threat to NATO navies).
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** Balev, B., "The Military-Political Strategy of Imperialism on
the World Ocean", World Economics and International Relations,
April 1986, pp 24-31. (A Soviet perspective on the Maritime
Strategy «— " novaya morskaya strategiya " . The three notional
phases restyled as "Keeping Oneself on the Verge of War",
"Seizing the Initiative", and "Carrying Combat Operations into
Enemy Territory").
** Komenskiy, Captain First Rank V., "The NATO Strategic Command in
the Atlantic" and "Combat Exercises of the Combined NATO Forces
in 1985", Zarubezhnoye Voyennoye Qbozreniye , April 1986 (pp
47-53 and August 1986 pp 45-51 ) . ( Includes discussion of roles
and missions of NATO naval forces in the context of the Maritime
Strategy). See also Rodin, Colonel V, "The Military Doctrines
of Japan", August 1986, pp 3-9.
Ries, Tomas and Skorve, Johnny, Investigating Kola: A Study of
Military Bases Using Satellite Photos , Oslo: Norsk
Utenrikspolitisk Institutt, 1986. (See especially pp 21-49, on
the place of Fenno-Scandia and adjacent waters in the context of
overall Soviet strategy)
.
MccGwire, CDR Michael, RN (Ret.), "Soviet Military Objectives",
World Policy Journal , Fall 1986, pp 667-695. (Adapted from his
book, cited below. Much that goes against the grain of
contemporary informed conventional wisdom regarding Soviet
intentions, including the naval threat. Mediterranean seen as
particularly important. See especially pp 676-680).
** Manthorpe, CAPT William, USN (Ret.), "The Soviet View:
RimPac-86", Proceedings , October 1986, p 191. (The Soviets see
linkages between the Maritime Strategy and allied exercises).
van Tol, Robert, "Soviet Naval Exercises 1983-1985", Naval
Forces , Vl/1986, pp 18-34. (Most useful in its discussion of
the interactions between NATO and Soviet strategies and between
NATO and Soviet exercises).
MccGwire, CDR Michael, RN (Ret.), Military Objectives in Soviet




Schandler, Herbert Y. , "Arms Control in Northeast Asia", The
Washington Quarterly , Winter 1987, pp 69-79. (Wide-ranging
article which gives the context within which the Maritime
Strategy operates in the Pacific. Highlights "the ever-looming
nightmare of a two-front war" as gaining in credibility for the
Soviet Union. "This two-front threat is enormously important to
Soviet psychology and provides the United States with a major
pressure point on Soviet leaders").
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Mozgovoy, Aleksandr, "For Security on Sea Routes", International
Affairs (Moscow), 1/1987, pp 77-84, 103. (See especially p 83,
on the Maritime Strategy as "an unprecedentedly impudent
document, even given the militaristic hysteria reigning in
Washington today").
Manthorpe, CAPT William, USN (Ret.), "The Soviet View: More
Than Meets the Eye", Proceedings , February 1987, pp 117-118.
(Sophisticated analysis of 3-4 October 1986 Red Star article on
potential changes in Soviet doctrine, strategic thinking and
planning that, if adopted, will have important implications for
Soviet response to the Maritime Strategy).
Weinberger, Caspar, Soviet Military Power 1987 , Washington:
USGPO, March 1987. (More extensive analysis of Soviet strategy
and operational concepts than in previous five editions).
U.S. Navy, Office of Naval Intelligence, "Current Intelligence
Issues", Washington: Department of the Navy Office of
Information, March 1987. (See especially pp 1-4 on the
anticipated employment of Soviet naval forces in wartime).
Breemer, Jan, "U.S. Maritime Strategy: A Re-Appraisal", Naval
Forces , 11/1987, pp 64-76. (Discusses the background behind and
the issues surrounding current U.S. Navy thinking on Soviet
naval strategy).
** Elliott, Frank, "Soviets Knew of Maritime Strategy Before
Lehman, Watkins Publicized It", Defense Week May 4 1987, p 5.
(Reports on important Seminar on Soviet views of the Maritime
Strategy. See also Seminar transcript, Annapolis: US Naval
Institute, 1987).
** Daniel, Donald C.F., "The Soviet Navy and Tactical Nuclear War
at Sea", Survival , July/August 1987, pp 138+. (The Director of
the Naval War College's Strategy and Campaign Department
concludes, inter alia , that Soviet decision makers will use
nuclear weapons at sea only if they have already been used




VII. PEACETIME, CRISES, AND THIRD WORLD CONTINGENCIES
Most of the above works deal principally with use of the Navy in
general war. ^What follows are books and articles of the 1970s and
1980s discussing the uses of the U.S. Navy in peacetime, crises, and
"small wars" (the "Violent Peace" of the Maritime Strategy). Many
of these derive from the increased discussion of peacetime presence
as a naval mission engendered by Admirals Elmo Zumwalt and
Stansfield Turner in the early 1970s. Thus, the contemporary era of
U.S. Navy thought on peacetime presence operations began about five
years prior to that on forward global wartime operational concepts.
Both bodies of thought, however, have build on the earlier
literature of the late 1950s and 1960s on the role of the U.S. Navy
in limited war.
While most of the items listed below focus on the U.S. Navy,
there is a significant literature on the peacetime/crisis/"small
war" activities of the Royal Navy and the Soviet Navy as well, some
of the most important elements of which have been included here. In
addition, certain of the "White Papers" and "Defense Reports"
published by various defense ministries around the world routinely
highlight the peacetime operations of their naval forces.
Especially notable in this regard are the annual British "Defense
Estimates" and Canadian "Annual Reports."
Joint Senate/House Armed Services Subcommittee. Ninety-First
Congress, Second Session. Hearings on CVAN-70 Aircraft Carrier ,
Washington: USGPO, 1970. pp. 162-165. (Listing of uses of USN
in wars/near-wars 1946-1969; takes negative view of same.
Cable, James, Gunboat Diplomacy: Political Applications of
Limited Naval Force , New York: Praeger, 1970. (First of a spate
of useful books seeking to list, classify, and describe
peacetime uses of navies. Surveys twentieth century activities
of all major navies. Updated in 1981.
Howe, CDR Jonathan, Multicrisis: Sea Power and Global Politics
in the Missile Age , Cambridge MA: MIT Press, 1971. (The 1967
Mideast crisis, the 1958 Quemoy crisis, and the effectiveness of
conventional naval forces as foreign policy instruments, by a
future flag officer and political-military affairs
sub-specialist. Argues for a strong global naval posture,
especially in the Mediterranean).
Bull, Hedley, "Sea Power and Political Influence", in Power at
Sea: I. The New Environment , Adelphi Paper Number 12 2, London:
International Institute for Strategic Studies, 1974, pp 1-9.
("The period we are now entering will be one in which
opportunities for the diplomatic use of naval forces, at least
for the great powers, will be severely circumscribed").
Moore, CAPT J. E. , RN, "The Business of Surveillance", Navy
International , June 1974, pp 9-10. (Rationale for peacetime
surveillance operations at sea).
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'McGruther, LCDR Kenneth. "The Role of Perception in Naval
Diplomacy, " Naval War College Review , September-October 1974, p
3-20. (Part of the initial Zumwalt-Turner new look at USN
"Naval Presence" mission. Includes Indian Ocean case study and
a "cookbook". By a future OP-603 staffer).
McNulty, CDR James, "Naval Presence - The Misunderstood
Mission. " Naval War College Review , September-October 1974, pp
21-31. (Another reflection of the initial Zumwalt-Turner focus
on presence. See also Turner, VADM Stansf ield, "Challenge, " pp
1-2, in the same issue.
Luttwak, Edward N., The Political Uses of Sea Power , Baltimore?
Johns Hopkins University Press, 1974. (Short treatment
sponsored by VADM Turner. Typology and analysis based on
concept of "suasion." Focus on the U.S. Navy in the
Mediterranean.
)
Young, Elizabeth, "New Laws for Old Navies: Military
Implications of the Law of the Sea, " Survival , November-December
1974, pp 262-267. (Forecasts the demise of naval diplomacy.)
Hill, CAPT J. R., RN, "Maritime Power and the Law of the Sea",
Survival , Mar/Apr 1975, pp 69-72. (Takes issue with Young's
article. Suggests that, "in the turbulent future, maritime
forces are likely to be more rather than less in demand both at
home and away").
MccGwire, CDR Michael, RN (Ret.), "Changing Naval Operations and
Military Intervention", in Stern, Ellen P., The Limits of
Military Intervention , Beverly Hills: Sage, 1977, pp 151-178,
and reprinted in Naval War College Review , Spring 1977, pp
3-25. (Sees numerous constraints now in place on the "almost
casual use of force which used to be the norm" in military
intervention by sea).
MccGwire, CDR Michael, RN (Ret.) and McDonnell, John (eds.),
Soviet Naval Influence: Domestic and Foreign Dimensions , New
York: Praeger, 1977. (See especially chapters by MccGwire,
Booth, Dismukes, and Kelly).
Booth, Ken, Navies and Foreign Policy , London: Croon Helm,
1977. (Magisterial treatment.)
Mahoney, Robert B., Jr., "U.S. Navy Responses to International
Incidents and Crises, 1955-1975, " Washington: Center for Naval
Analyses, 1977. (Survey of USN crisis operations and summaries
of incidents and responses.
Nathan, James A. and Oliver, James K., "The Evolution of
International Order and the Future of the American Naval
Presence Mission", Naval War College Review , Fall 1977, pp
37-59. (Sees political and technological changes as
necessitating revision to contemporary thinking on naval
presence, just when that thinking had begun to solidify)
.
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Eldredge, CAPT Howard S., "Nonsuperpower Sea Denial Capability:
The Implications for Superpower Navies Engaged in Presence
Operations", in Ra'anan, Uri et al. (eds.), Arms Transfers to
the Third" World
,
Boulder CO: Westview, 1978, pp 21-64. (Argues
that growing sea denial arsenals of littoral nations are
complicating the risk calculations of the superpowers in using
naval forces to further their interests. Focus on anti-ship
missiles and submarine torpedoes).
Blechman, Barry M., and Kaplan, Stephen S., Force Without War:
U. S. Armed Forces as a Political Instrument , Washington:




Congressional Budget Office, "U. S. Naval Forces: The Peacetime
Presence Mission," Washington: 1978. (How it could allegedly be
done with fewer CVs.)
Zakheim, Dov S., "Maritime Presence, Projection, and the
Constraints of Parity", in Equivalence, Sufficiency and the
International Balance , Washington: National Defense University,
August 1978, pp 101-118. (Argues for a combined arms approach,
vice solely naval focus, re: U.S. maritime presence).
Dismukes, Bradford and McConnell, James M.
,
(eds.), Soviet Naval
Diplomacy , New York: Pergamon Press, 1979 (Comprehensive
surveys and analyses.)
Madison, CDR Russell L. , "The War of Unengaged Forces —
Superpowers at Sea in an Era of Competitive Coexistence", Naval
War College Review , March-April 1979, pp 82-94. (Thoughtful
piece seeking to integrate naval peacetime and wartime missions
into one framework: the "Theory of Unengaged Force Warfare").
Smith, Edward Allen, Jr., "Naval Confrontation: The
Intersuperpower Use of Naval Suasion in Times of Crisis", Ph.D.
Dissertation, American University, 1979. (Examination of U.S.
and Soviet use of their navies in six postwar crises. Heavily
influenced by Luttwak's concept of "naval suasion").
Allen, CAPT Charles D., Jr., USN (Ret.), The Uses of Navies in
Peacetime , Washington: American Enterprise Institute, 1980c
Excellent short analysis, with typology. (Focus on postwar U.S.
Navy, and on escalation.)
Kaplan, Stephen S., Diplomacy of Power: Soviet Armed Forces as a
Political Instrument , Washington: Brookings Institution, 1981.
(Does for the Soviets what Blechman and Kaplan did for the U.S.)
Cohen, Raymond, International Politics: The Rules of the Game ,
London, Longman, 1981, pp. 41-48. (One of the few general works
on international relations by an academic political scientist to
deal in any depth with the peacetime and crisis uses of navies.
Navy force movements seen as part of the "vocabulary of
international politics.")
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Truver, Scott C, "New International Constraints on Military
Power: Navies in the Political Role", Naval War College Review
,
July-August 1981, pp 99-104. (Sees regular employment of major
naval combatants and large-deck carriers as becoming less
tenable in Third World areas for the remainder of the century,
for a variety of reasons).
Neutze, CDR Dennis R. , JAGC, "Bluejacket Diplomacy: A Juridical
Examination of the Use of Naval Forces in Support of United
States Foreign Policy", JAG Journal , Summer 1982, pp 81-158.
(By the legal advisor to the Deputy Chief of Naval Operations
for Plans, Policy, and Operations. Very comprehensive
examination of the lawfulness of the political uses of U.S.
naval power in terms of domestic and international law, going
back to the framers of the Constitution. Sees such political
uses as expanding in the future).
* tTaylor, COL William J., Jr., USA (Ret.), and Cottrell, Alvin J
"Stability, political Decay, and Navies," Orbis, Fall 1982, pp.
579-522. (Limitations of naval interventions
.
)
Wright, Christopher C. , III, "U. S. Naval Operations in 1982."
Proceedings /Naval Review , May 1983. Excellent survey and
analysis. ( Includes general introduction to USN concepts of
operations, deployment patterns, tempo of operations, as well as
review of actual deployments.) See also annual updates in
subsequent Naval Reviews .
Hickman, LCDR William J., "Did it Really Matter?" Naval War
College Review , March-April 1983, pp. 17-30. (By a future
OP-603 staffer. On limitations and misuses of USN naval
presence operations. Indian Ocean case study is useful
counterpoint to McGruther article a decade earlier, above.)
Barnett, CAPT Roger W. , "The U.S. Navy's Role in Countering
Maritime Terrorism", Terrorism , Vol 6, No 3, 1983, pp 469-480.
(A primary architect of the Maritime Strategy argues that while
the U.S. Navy is well prepared against attacks on its own ships
and installations, its role in deterring terrorist attacks on
U.S. merchant ships or overseas facilities "cannot be suggested
to be a large one").
Zelikow, Philip D., "Force Without War, 1975-82," Journal of
Strategic Studies , March 1984, pp. 29-54. (Updates Blechman and
Kaplan book. Also provides listing of incidents when USN was
used.
)
Cable, Sir James, "Showing the Flag, " Proceedings , April 1984,
pp. 59-63. (The utility of ship visits .
)
Luttwak, Edward N., The Pentagon and the Art of War , New York:
Simon and Schuster, 1984, pp. 222, 247-248. (Sees diminishing
value of peacetime deployments.)
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Howe/ RADM Jonathan T. , "Multicrisis Management: Meeting an
Expanding Challenge", in Uri Ra ' anan and Robert L. Pfaltzgraff,
Jr. (eds.-=), Security Commitments and Capabilities; Elements of
An American Global Strategy , Hamden CT : Archon Books, 1985, pp
125-137. (Reflections on America's ability to manage
"multicrises ", through naval as well as other means, by the U.S.
naval officer who popularized the term 15 years earlier).
Martin, Laurence, "The Use of Naval Forces in Peacetime", Naval
War College Review , January-February 1985, pp 4-14. (A lecture
summarizing many contemporary themes on the subject).
U.S. Senate, Armed Services Committee, Ninety-ninth Congress,
First Session, Hearings on the Department of Defense
Authorization for Appropriations for Fiscal Year 1986, Part 8 ,
Washington: USGPO, 1986, pp 4409-4448. ( YADM James A. Lyons on
"Global Naval Commitments", February 28, 1985. The official
policy enunciated by the Deputy Chief of Naval Operations for
Plans, Policy and Operations (OP-06) )
.
Arnott, CDR Ralph E. and Gaffney, CDR William A., "Naval
Presence: Sizing the Force", Naval War College Review
,
March-April 1985, pp 18-30. (Seeks to develop a rational
structured approach to choosing a force tailored to respond to a
particular crisis, so as to achieve the desired outcome with
minimum effect on scheduled fleet operations).
Lehman, John F. , Jr., "An Absolute Requirement for Every
American, " Sea Power , April 1985, p. 13. (SECNAV argues high
USN peacetime operating tempo is partly self -generated. See
also Washington Post , October 6, 1985, p. A12, and Virginia
Pilot/Ledger Star , October 27, 1985, p. Al .
)
Daniel, Donald C. , and Tarleton, Gael D., "The Soviet Navy in
1984," Proceedings /Naval Review , May 1985, pp. 90-92, 361-364.
(Snapshot of one year's Soviet global peacetime activity See
subsequent Naval Reviews for updates.)
Etzold, Thomas H. , "Neither Peace Nor War: Navies and
Low-intensity Conflict," in Ullman, Harlan K., and Etzold,
Thomas H. , Future Imperative: National Security and the U.S.
Navy in the Late 1980s , Washington: CSIS, 1985. (Argues
low-intensity USN contingencies and peacetime operations are on
the increase.
)
Levine, Daniel B. , Planning for Underway Replenishment of Naval
Forces in Peacetime (CRM 85-77) , Alexandria VA: Center for
Naval Analyses, September 1985. (Much more than underway
replenishment. Examines U.S. Navy fleet exercises, crisis
response and surveillance operations. Analyses them by ocean
area, frequency, and number/types of combatants used).
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Harris, CDR R. Robinson, and Benkert, LCDR Joseph, "Is That All
There Is?", Proceedings , October 1985, pp. 32-37. (Contrasts
peacetime^ and global war strategy requirements, with focus on
surface combatants.)
Booth, Ken, Law, Force, and Diplomacy at Sea , London: George
Allen & Unwin. 1985. (Peacetime naval strategy and the Law of
the Sea, and much more. Rebuts Elizabeth Young arguments of a
decade earlier, pp. 66-68.)
Hill, RADM J.R., RN, Maritime Strategy for Medium Powers,
Annapolis: Naval Institute Press, 1986. (Chapter 6, "Normal
Conditions", pp 88-110, describes the various roles of navies,
especially those of medium sized countries, in peacetime.
Chapter 7, "Low Intensity Operations", pp 88-131, covers
operations somewhat higher up on the scale of violence).
Parritt, Brigadier Brian, Violence at Sea: A Review of
Terrorism, Acts of War and Piracy, and Countermeasures to
Prevent Terrorism , Paris: ICC Publishing, 1986. (See
especially Paul Wilkinson's "Terrorism and the Maritime
Environment", pp 35-40, on the role of navies in combating
terrorism and the kinds of naval force required).
Mandel, Robert, "The Effectiveness of Gunboat Diplomacy",
International Studies Quarterly , March 1986, pp 5 9-76. ("The
most effective gunboat diplomacy involves a definitive,
deterrent display of force undertaken by an assailant who has
engaged in war in the victim's region and who is militarily
prepared and politically stable compared to the victim").
** Elliot, Frank, "Battleships Assume Some Carrier Duties", Navy
Times , March 31, 1986, pp 25, 28. (Role of battleships
vis-a-vis carriers in the presence mission).
** Vlahos, Michael, "The Third World in U.S. Navy Planning", Orbis
,
Spring 1986, pp 133-148. (By a former Naval War College faculty
member. Argues the U.S. Navy has recently refocused its
attention on its contributions to a global allied campaign
against the Soviets, to the detriment of planning for more
likely and qualitatively different Third World contingencies).
Cable, Sir James, "Gunboat . Diplomacy ' s Future", Proceedings ,
August 1986, pp 36-41. (Forcefully argues that the days of
gunboat diplomacy are by no means over. Denigrates those who
have said otherwise).
Coutau-Begarie, Herve, "The Role of the Navy in French Foreign
Policy", Naval Forces , Vl/1986, pp 36-43. (By probably the most
important contemporary French writer on naval strategy. The
recent French global experience, one not often discussed in an
English-language literature dominated by U.S., British, and
Soviet examples).
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"Navy Cuts Carrier Presence in Mediterranean, Gulf Areas",
Washington Times , 24 November 1986, p 4-D. (On adjustments to
U.S. Navy routine forward presence posture to enhance Navy
flexibility and reduce individual ship OPTEMPO).
James, Lawrence, "Old Problems and Old Answers: Gunboat
Diplomacy Today", Defense Analysis , December 1986, pp 324-327.
(On its limitations, past and present).
Bush, Ted, "Sailors Spending More Time at Home Under PersTempo"
,
Navy Times , February 9, 1987, p 3. (On naval presence and
morale. The U.S. Navy tries to balance conflicting
requirements). See also Philpott, Tom and Burlage, John,
"Stepped Up Operations May Cut Home Port Time", Navy Times , June
22, 1987, pp 1+8; and Burlage, John, "CNO Trost: No Retreat on
OpTempo", Navy Times , July 13, 1987, pp 1 + 26.
Cable, Sir James, "Showing the Flag: Past and Present", Naval
Forces , No. III/1987, pp 38-49. (Update of Cable's thought on
this particular aspect of peacetime naval operations). C_f his
views in the April 1984 Proceedings , cited above.
Jordan, COL Amos A., USA (Ret), "A National Strategy for the
1990s", The Washington Quarterly: Summer 1987, p 15. (The
president of the Center for Strategic and International Studies
sees Third World peoples as increasingly uncowed by "gunboat
diplomacy and other similar kinds of hollow threats").
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VIII. FLEET BALANCE; ATLANTIC VS. PACIFIC VS. MEDITERRANEAN
Geographic flexibility is one of the great strengths of naval
power. Yet the U. S. Navy's global posture since World War II has
often looked like a series of hard-and-fast theater commitments,
more appropriate to less flexible land -based types of forces. The
articles and letters below illustrate current problems of
implementing a balanced global Maritime Strategy with limited naval
forces in the face of competing regional demands. They were
selected because of their focus on the need for hard choices by the
Navy regarding fleet balance; articles merely trumpeting the
importance of an area or discussing regional priorities solely at
the geopolitical level are omitted.
Booth, Ken, "U. S. Naval Strategy: Problems of Survivability,
Usability, and Credibility," Naval War College Review , Summer
1978, pp. 11-28. (Argues for withdrawal of Sixth Fleet.)
McGruther, LCDR Kenneth R., "Two Anchors in the Pacific: A
Strategy Proposal for the U. S. Pacific Fleet," Naval Review
1979/ Proceedings May 1979, pp. 126-141. (On reorienting the
Pacific Fleet primarily northward for wartime operations, and
secondarily westward, for peacetime presence, by a former OP-603
staffer. )
Etzold, Thomas, "From Far East to Middle East: Overextension in
American Strategy Since World War II", Proceedings/Naval Review
1981 , May 1981, pp. 66-77. (On the need to make hard strategic
choices, especially between the Pacific and Indian Ocean.)
Cole, CDR Bernard, "Atlantic First," Proceedings , August 1982,
pp. 103-106. Also "Comment and Discussion:" December 1982, pp.
86-87.
Deutermann, CAPT Peter, "Requiem for the Sixth Fleet,"
Proceedings , September 1982, pp. 46-49. Also "Comment and
Discussion:" November 1982, p. 14; January 1983, pp. 17-20;
February 1983, pp. 80-81; March 1983, pp. 12-17; July 1983, p.
89.
Breemer, Jan S., "De-Committing the Sixth Fleet," Naval War
College Review . November-December 1982, pp. 27-3 2.
Jampoler, CAPT Andrew, "Reviewing the Conventional Wisdom,
"
Proceedings , July 1983, pp. 22-28. Also "Comment and
Discussion:" December 1983, p. 26. (On refocusing the Atlantic
Fleet from the Mediterranean to the North Atlantic).
Ortlieb, CDR E. V., "Forward Deployments: Deterrent or
Temptation." Proceedings , December 1983, pp. 36-40. Also
"Comment and Discussion:" February 1984, p. 22. (On reducing






Maiorano, LT Alan, "A Fresh
Proceedings , February 1984,
Discussion:" July 1984, pp. 28-33.









Dismukes, Bradford, and Weiss, Kenneth G.,
Mediterranean Theater, " in James L. George






timing reductions in Navy Mediterranean forces).
Sestak, LCDR Joseph, "Righting the Atlantic Tilt," Proceedings
,
January 1986, pp. 64-71.
Kolodziej, Edward A., "The Southern Flank: NATO's Neglected
Front", AEI Foreign Policy and Defense Review , Vol. 6 No. 2,
1986, pp. 45-56, especially pp. 48-50. (A leading political
scientist endorses CAPT Deutermann's views on reorienting U.S.
naval concentrations from the Mediterranean to the Atlantic.)
Lee, Ngoc and F-r.ge, LCDR Alan, RAN, "The Naval Balance in the
Indian-Pacific Ocean Region", Naval Forces , 11/1987, pp
150-175. (Views the U.S. Navy as under strength for warfightin
in the Atlantic-Mediterranean threats, and over strength in the
Pacific and Indian Oceans. Essentially an update of Hinge's
August 1986 article, cited in Section II above).
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IX. WAR GAMING
As is well discussed in previous sections, U.S. and allied
navies, other services, and joint and allied commands have a variety
of means at -their disposal in peacetime to test the wartime validity
of aspects of the Maritime Strategy, besides debate and discussion.
They actually participate in fleet exercises, advanced tactical
training
, and "real world" peacetime and crisis operations, and
they conduct extensive operations analyses and war games. Most of
these avenues are generally inaccessible to the public, however,
save one: gaming. There are over a half-dozen commercial board and
computer games now available that can provide players with insights
into modern maritime strategic, operational, and tactical problems
and potential solutions, and thereby further enhance players'
understanding of the Maritime Strategy. Like all simulations,
however, they each have their limitations, and even built-in
inaccuracies (as the various reviews point out). Thus they cannot
by themselves legitimately be used to "prove" validities or
demonstrate "outcomes". Nevertheless, playing them is the nearest
many students and theorists of Maritime Strategy can ever come to
actually "being there"/ and therefore is an activity that can only
be encouraged.-
A. Commentary
** Perla, Peter C. , "Wargaming and the U.S. Navy", National
Defense , February 1987, pp 49-53. (By a leading Center for
Naval Analyses war gamer. "The Navy is continuing a process of
using wargaming, exercises, and analysis to address the aspects
of major issues for which they are best suited... a classic
example of this process can be seen at work in the 2nd Fleet
.
Taking the promulgated maritime strategy as his starting point,
the commander, 2nd Fleet, proposed a concept for operating the
NATO Striking Fleet in the Norwegian Sea. A wargame was held at
the Naval War College to explore this concept, and analysis was
undertaken to quantify some of the issues raised by the game.
Then an exercise was held in the area of interest, which
confirmed some assumptions and raised new questions. A new
series of games and analysis was capped by a second major
exercise, as the process continues"). See also his "What
Wargaming is and is Not", co -authored by LCDR Raymond T.
Barrett, Naval War College Review , September-October 1985, pp
70-78 (and "In My View..." commentary, Naval War College Revi ew,
Autumn 1986, pp. 105-108); and "War Games, Analyses, and
Exercises", Naval War College Review , Spring 1987, pp. 44-52
(and endorsement by former CNO ADM Thomas Hayward, USN (Ret), in
August 1987 Proceedings )
.
Connors, LCDR Tracy D., USNR, "Gaming for the World",
Proceedings , January 1984, pp 106-108. (On the Naval War
College's Global War Game series, a principal research tool for
identifying critical Navy, joint, and allied Maritime Strategy
issues). See also Murray, Robert J., "A War-Fighting
Perspective", Proceedings , October 1983, pp 66-81; and Eulis,
CDR James, "War Gaming at the U.S. Naval War College", Naval






Gary , North Atlantic '86 , Mountain View, CA: Strategic
Simulations Inc~ 1983 (Apple Computer Game). Reviewed by John
Gresham and Michael Markowitz, Proceedings , July 1984, pp
116-117. (Entering premise in the initial failure of NATO,
U.S., and the Maritime Strategy: "The great war in Europe is
over. As expected, Russia won; it now controls all of Germany
and Norway. Its next plan: complete domination of the North
Atlantic through the isolation of Great Britain").
Nichols, W. J. , Grey Seas, Grey Skies , Bridgewater, Nova Scotia:
Simulations Canada, 1983 (second edition forthcoming in 1987)
(Apple Computer Game). Reviewed by John Gresham and Michael
Markowitz, Proceedings , July 1984, pp 116-117. (Seven
"pre-built" scenarios, including Japanese destroyers versus
Soviet submarines in the Kuril Islands, a Soviet amphibious
group versus West German forces in the Baltic, U.S. versus
Soviet carrier battle groups off the North Cape, and similar
clashes in the Western Pacific and the Medit< . anean. Focus is
more tactical than the other games listed here).
Nichols, W.J., Fifth Escadra , Bridgewater, Nova Scotia:
Simulations Canada, 1984 (Apple Computer Game). (Soviets vs
NATO in the Mediterranean. Five levels of conflict ranging froni
rising tensions to global nuclear war).
Nichols, W. J., Seventh Fleet , Bridgewater, Nova Scotia:
Simulations Canada, 1985 (Apple Computer Game). (Soviets vs
U.S. and Japan. Includes Sea of Okhotsk, Sea of Japan, and
South China Sea operations).
Balkoski, Joseph, Sixth Fleet , New York: Victory Games, 1986
(Board Game). Reviewed by U.S. Naval History Center historian
Michael A. Palmer, Strategy and Tactics , January-February 1986,
pp 51-5 2. ("The inclusion of random elements into the system,
the addition of logistic rules, and the key role of Soviet nava]
aviation made the Sixth Fleet game an excellent operational
level naval wargame")
.
** Balkoski, Joseph, Second Fleet , New York: Victory Games, 1986
(Board Game). Reviewed by U.S. Naval History Center historian
Michael A. Palmer, Proceedings , March 1987, pp 160-162. ("Those
of us without access to the War College's computers can test th«|i
waters north of the Greenland -Iceland -United Kingdom (GIUK) Gap
and gain insight into the problems and opportunities inherent i:
the application of the Maritime Strategy". Can be played
simultaneously with Sixth Fleet , with forces shifted from one
set of maps to the other, in a simulation of war in both
Northern and Southern European waters and adjacent areas).
Herman, Mark, Aegean Strike , New York: Victory Games, 1986
(Board Game). Reviewed by U.S. Naval History Center historian
Michael A. Palmer, Strategy and Tactics , (forthcoming in 1987)
(The eastern Mediterranean. "Few, if any, games .. .better





The general and historical literature on naval strategy is
admittedly vast. What is presented here are only books that
describe earlier strategies -- conceptualized, planned and/or
implemented — which are analogous to key aspects of the U. S.
Navy's Maritime Strategy today. The materials are generally listed
chronologically, by historical period covered.
Till, Geoffrey, Maritime Strategy and the Nuclear Age , (Second
Edition), New York: St. Martin's, 1984. (Basic one-volume
historical and topical survey.)
Callwell, Major C.E., BA, The Effect of Maritime Command on Land
Campaigns Since Waterloo , Edinburgh: William Blackwood and
Sons, 1897 (especially pp 178-182 and 196-197)'; Barker, A. J.,
The War Against Russia, 1854-1856 , New York: Holt, Rinehart and
Winston, 1970; Curtiss, John Shelton, Russia's Crimean War
,
Durham, N.C. : Duke University Press, 1979; and Rich, Norman,
the Crimean War? A Cautionary Tale , Hanover, NH : University
Press of New England, 1985 (especially pp 124-126, 136-137,
158-159, 178, 201-202, 206-209). (Successful maritime global
forward coalition strategy against Russia 130 years ago, with
operations in Barents, Baltic, and Black Seas, and off Kuriles
and Kamchatka. Component of a larger military strategy, which
blocked subsequent Russian expansion for over 20 years).
*• Mahan, CAPT Alfred Thayer, "The Problem of Asia", in his The
Problem of Asia and Its Effect Upon International Politics
,
Cambridge MA: University Press, 1900, pp 1-146. (Mahan on
"restraining Russia", the central problem of the Maritime
Strategy: "The Russian centre cannot be broken. It is upon,
and from, the flanks... that restraint, if needed, must come" (p
26) ; "hence ensues solidarity of interest between Germany, Great
Britain, Japan and the United States" (p 63)). See also
Trofimenko, in Section VI above, and Crowl, Philip A., "Alfred
Thayer Mahan: The Naval Historian", in Paret, Peter (ed.),
Makers of Modern Strategy: From Machiavelli to the Nuclear Age
,
Princeton NJ: Princeton University Press, 1986, pp 444-477,
especially p 477. (A Naval War College professor emeritus
asserts the Maritime Strategy is antithetical to Mahan '
s
teaching, especially as regards the role of other services, in a
book which otherwise--and to its detriment--pays scant attention
to makers of modern maritime strategy. Trofimenko gets the
linkage between Mahan and the Maritime Strategy right. Crowl
gets it wrong)
.
Schilling, Warner R., "Admirals and Foreign Policy, 1913-1919,"
PhD. Dissertation, Yale University, 1954. ("Maritime Strategy"
of the 1980s was not first time this century U.S. Navy developed
a coherent preferred strategy.)
Palmer, Alan, The Gardeners of Salonika , New York: Simon and
Schuster, 1965. See especially pp. 226-247. (Southern Flank
Maritime Strategy in action. WWI allies advance to the Danube
from beachhead in Greece in 1918 knocking Austria-Hungary,
Bulgaria, Turkey out of the war. Gallipoli concept vindicated*)
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Roskill, Stephen W. , Naval Policy Between the Wars, Volume I:
The Period of Anglo-American Antagonism, 1919-1929
, New York:
Walker, 1968. Chapter III: "The War of Intervention in Russia,
1918-1920" ; and Dobson, Christopher, and Miller, John, The Day
They Almost Bombed Moscow: The Allied War in Russia, 1918-1920
,
New York: Atheneum, 1986, pp 42-47, 72-73, 247-266, and
274-276. (Poorly devised global, allied, forward maritime
operations against the Soviets 70 years ago, which, however, did
achieve independence for the Baltic states).
** Miller, Edward S., War Plan Orange, 1897-1945: The Naval
Campaign Through the Central Pacific , Annapolis: Naval
Institute Press, forthcoming in 1988. (History's most
successful pre-war plan, with lessons for the complex problems
of naval strategic planning of the 1980s). See also Dyer, VADM
George C. , On the Treadmill to Pearl Harbor: The Memoirs of
Admiral James O. Richardson, USN (Retired)
,
Washington: Naval
History Division, Department of the Navy, 1973, Chapter XIV:
"War Plans"; and Shelton, CDR Michael W., CEC, "Plan Orange
Revisited", Proceedings , December 1984, pp 50-56; and "Comment
and Discussion", March 1985, p^"7^ and 79. (Draws false
parallels between the Western Pacific in 1941 and the Norwegian
Sea today, i.e. between a purely naval, unilateral, theater
problem and one portion of a joint, allied, global problem.
Advocates ceding the Norwegian Sea, Norway, and Iceland to the
Soviets. Bad history and worse strategy).
** Vlahos, Michael, "Wargaming, an Enforcer of Strategic Realism:
1919-1942", Naval War College Review , March-April 1986, pp
7
— 22. (By a former Naval War College faculty member. How
wargaming prepared the U.S. Navy for war in 1941, and how it is
doing so again today, including linkage between gaming and
planning)
.
** Reynolds, Clark G. , "The Maritime Strategy of World War II:
Some Implications?", Naval War College Review , May -June 1986, pj
43-50. (By a former Naval Academy faculty member. Gleans
lessons and implications for today's Maritime Strategy from thai
of World War II)
.
** Turner, ADM Stansfield, USN (Ret.), "Victory at Sea: Bull
Halsey at Leyte Gulf". Washington Post Book World , Dec 15,
1986, pp 1 & 13. (Review of E.B. Potter's Bull Halsey . Draws
analogies to today's military problems, especially regarding
"the offense and the defense". Of a piece with Turner's c':aer
writings )
Erickson, John, The Road to Stalingrad (Vol. I) and The Road to
Berlin (Vol. II), Boulder CO: Westview Press, 1983. See
especially Vol. I: pp. 14, 55-57, 218, 237-240, 271-272, 295;
Vol. II: pp. 43, 132, 156. (Effect of Far East operations — o
lack thereof — on Central/East Europe Front in World War II.
)
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Spykman, Nicholas John, The Geography of the Peace , New York:
Harcourt, Brace, 1944. (Basic geopolitical reference. See
especially maps, pp. 50-54.)
Love, Robert, B., Jr. (Ed.), The Chiefs of Naval Operations
,
Annapolis: U. S. Naval Institute Press, 1980. (See sections on
post-World War II CNOs ' views on strategy, especially Rosenberg
piece on Arleigh Burke).
Rosenberg, David, "American Postwar Air Doctrine and
Organization: The Navy Experience," in A. F. Hurley and R. C.
Ehrhart, et al_. Air Power and Warfare , Washington: USGPO, 1970.
(Antecedent naval postwar air strike strategies; by a leading
historian of U. S. Navy postwar strategy.)
Nimitz, FADM Chester, "Future Employment of Naval Forces,"
Vital Speeches , Jan. 15, 1948, pp. 214-217. (Also, in Brassey '
s
Naval Annual: 1948 , and Shipmate , February 1948, pp. 5-6+, as
"Our Navy. It's Future."! (Argues for a projection strategy and
a Navy capable of land attack early in a war.)
Cave Brown, Anthony (Ed.), Dropshot, The American Plan for World
War III Against Russia in 1957 , New York: Dial Press, 1978.
(1949 JCS study: good example of early post-war strategic
thinking. See especially pp. 161-165, 206-211, 225-235.) (Not
to be read without examination of review by David Rosenberg and
Thomas E. Kelly III, Naval War College Review , Fall 1978, pp.
103-106.)
Palmer, Michael A. , Origins of the Maritime Strategy: American
Naval Strategy in the First Postwar Decade , Washington : Naval
Historical Center (forthcoming in 1988). (An important
discussion of the similarities and differences in U.S. naval
strategic thought between the first and fifth postwar decades,
the two postwar eras most characterized by US Navy concern with
problems of naval warfighting vis-a-vis the Soviet Union itself).
** Friedman, Norman, The Postwar Naval Revolution , London: Conway
Maritime Press, 1986. See especially Chapter 10, "Epilogue", pp
212-218. (On allied naval developments in the first post-World
War II decade, including relationships to the Maritime Strategy
developed three decades later).
Rosenberg, David, Arleigh Burke and the United States Navy, Vol
I: War and Cold War , Annapolis: Naval Institute Press,
(forthcoming in 1988) . (By a Naval War College faculty member.
"Maybe it would help us sell the Navy's case if we could make a
presentation on how the Navy could function in the first 90 days
of a war, and keep that presentation up to date "—RADM Burke in
1952 after relieving as OP-30, now OP-60)
.
Huntington, Samuel P., "National Policy and the Transoceanic
Navy", Proceedings , May 1954, pp 483-93. (Clearly foreshadows
the basic outline of the Maritime Strategy. An analysis
generally as relevant today as then).
• *
10-3
Marolda, Edward J., "The Influence of Burke's Boys on Limited
War", Proceedings , August 1981, pp 36-41. (By a prominent Navy
Department historian on the influence of the Navy officer corps
on national strategy a generation ago. "Between 1956 and 1960,
the Navy added its considerable influence to the intellectual
campaign within the national defense community for a
reorientation in strategic policy").
Wylie, CAPT J. C. , "Why A Sailor Thinks Like a Sailor",
Proceedings , August 1957, pp 811-817. (By the Navy's leading
public strategist of the 1950s and 60s. Remarkably similar to
the views expressed in the Maritime Strategy a generation later)
** Rosenberg, David, U.S. Navy Lonq-Range Planning; A Historical
Perspective , Washington: USGPO ( forthcoming in 1988)
.
Wylie, RADM J. C. , Military Strategy , New Brunswick, NJ: Rutgers
University Press, 1967. (Codification of views of USN's most
prominent post-war strategic theorist.)
Gray, Colin S., The Geopolitics of the Nuclear Era; Heartland,
Rimlands, and the Technological Revolution , New York: Crane
Russak, 1977. (Analyzes and updates geopolitical grand theory.
Stresses maritime aspects of the Western alliance and global
nature of Western security problems.
Comptroller General of the United States, Implications of the
National Security Council Study "U.S. Maritime Strategy and
Naval Force Requirements" On the Future Naval Ship Force
( PSAD-7 8-6A) , Washington: U.S. General Accounting Office, March
7, 1978. (Discusses in detail--and in highly unsympathetic
terms--the classified 1976 NSC study often cited by Secretary o:
the Navy John Lehman as triggering his thinking on U.S. naval
strategy and force levels. See also Rumsfeld, Donald, "Which
Five-Year Shipbuilding Program?", Proceedings , February 1977, pp
18-25).
Lehman, John, Aircraft Carriers: The Real Choices , Beverly
Hills: Sage, 1978. (Codification of Lehman's thought on naval
strategy before becoming SECNAV. Much more than carriers,
especially Chapter II). See also his March 1980 testimony in
U.S. Senate, Committee on the Budget, Ninety-Sixth Congress,
Second Session, Hearings on National Defense: Alternative
Approaches to the U.S. Defense Program , Washington: USGPO, 1980,
pp 208-25 3.
U.S. Navy, Sea Plan 2000: Naval Force Planning Study
(Unclassified Executive Summary) ^ Washington, DC: 28 March
1978. (A progenitor of the Maritime Strategy. Whereas the
latter stresses the role of the Navy in a global conventional
war with the Soviets, however, the former tended more toward
emphasizing the extent of the range of potential uses of naval
power )
.
Ryan, CAPT Paul USN (Ret), First Line of Defense , Stanford:
Hoover Institution Press, 1981. (Mainstream USN perspectives oi
post-war defense policies through the Carter Administration.)
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XI. MAKING MODERN NAVAL STRATEGY: INFLUENCES
Snyder, Jack, The Ideology of the Offensive; Military
Decisionmaking and the Disasters of 1914 , Ithaca, NY: Cornell
University Press, 1984. Chapter I. (On how military strategy
gets made, and why. Geopolitical, bureaucratic, and personal
factors. View military as predictably and unfortunately biased
toward offensive strategies.) See also his "Perceptions of the
Security Dilemma in 1914", in Robert Jervis, et al
.
(eds.),
Psychology and Deterrence , Baltimore: John Hopkins University
Press, 1985, pp 162-164. (Summarizes the literature on the
alleged "Military Bias for the Offensive").
Sagan, Scott D., "1914 Revisited: Allies, Offense, and
Instability", International Security , Fall 1986, pp 151-175.
(An excellent piece. Takes issue with literature on the alleged
"Military Bias for the Offensive". "Offensive military
doctrines are needed not only by states with expansionist war
aims, but also by states that have a strong interest in
protecting an exposed ally". See also Snyder, Jack and Sagan,
Scott D., "Correspondence: The Origins of Offense and the
Consequences of Counterforce", Winter 1986-87, pp 187-198)
.
Bartlett, Henry C. , "Approaches to Force Planning", Naval War
College Review , May -June 1985, pp 37-48. (By a Naval War
College faculty member. Provides eight approaches to Force
Planning, but each such "approach" can—and does--apply to the
drafting of Strategy as well. They are presented by the author
as pure types, stark alternatives, but in actual practice (for
example, in the development of the Maritime Strategy) their
influence on the strategist is often simultaneous, to a greater
or lesser degree. His list of approaches: "top-down",
"bottom-up", "scenario", "threat", "mission", "hedging",
"technology", and "fiscal". The first four were probably the
most important influences on the Maritime Strategy of the late
1940s-early 1950s and the 1980" s; "Mission" and "hedging" were
relatively more important from the late 1950s through the
mid-1970s. "Threat" influences tended to be driven more by
perceived capabi lities in the 1940s through the 1970s and more
by perceived intentions in the 1980s. Critics tend to focus on
"technology" and "budget " influences. There is actually also a
ninth approach, "historical/academic" approach, which tends to
focus the strategist on "lessons of history" and/or the great
classics of military thought. All these approaches coexist with
the organizational and psychological influences on war planning
identified by Jack Snyder. The remaining citations in this
section give examples, drawn primarily from the Maritime
Strategy debates).
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Johnson, CAPT W. Spencer, "Comment and Discussion" "Strategy:
Ours vs Theirs'", Proceedings , September 1984, p 107. (One of
the initial drafters of the Maritime Strategy elaborates on the
necessity, utility and existence of a national military strategy
from which the Maritime Strategy is derived. The "top-down"
view of strategy-building written in response to McGruther's
"threat-based" approach, cited below. See also "Comment and
Discussion", Proceedings , April 1984, p 31).
Hughes, CAPT Wayne P., USN (Ret.), "Naval Tactics and Their
Influence on Strategy", Naval War College Review
,
January-February 1986, pp 2-17. (The strategy -tactics
interface. The "bottom-up" view of strategy-building. See also
his Fleet Tactics; Theory and Practice , cited in Section II
above; and Hill, RADM C. A. "Mark", Jr., USN (Ret.), "Congress
and the Carriers", Wings of Gold Spring 1987, pp 6-8. But cf
"In My View...: Tactical Skills", Naval War College Review
,
May-June 1986, p 91: "The best plans are not those developed
through top-down or bottom-up approaches. Strategists and
tacticians need to keep in mind that the road to sound planning
is a two-way, not one-way thoroughfare").
Jampoler, CAPT Andrew, "A Central Role for Naval Forces? ... to
Support the Land Battle", Naval War College Review
,
November-December 1984. (By a member of the 1983-84 Strategic
Studies Group at Newport. Argument is distilled from a
"scenario" approach. See also fictional treatments by Clancy,
Hackett and McGeoch et al
.
, and Hayes et al , cited in Sections I
and II, above. )
.
McGruther, CDR Kenneth R., "Strategy: Ours vs Theirs".
Proceedings , February 1984, pp 344-39. (By a former member of
the Strategic Concepts Group (OP-603) . Calls for a strategy
based on defeating Soviet strategy, a "threat-based" approach.
Unlike Bartlett, however, McGruther's approach is rooted in
intentions as well as capabilities. Cf Vlahos chapter, cited in
Section I above).
Holloway, ADM James L. , III, USN (Ret.), "The U.S. Navy—
A
Functional Appraisal:, Oceanus , Summer 1985, pp 3-11. (Focus or
"mission" by the 1974-78 CNO: "The organization of fleet battle
strategy reflects the mission, functions, roles, and deployment
of the U.S. Navy"). See also Williams, CDR John A. "Jay", USNR,
"U.S. Navy Missions and Force Structure: A Critical
Reappraisal", Armed Forces and Society , Summer 1981, pp 499-528;
and Byron, CDR John, "Sea Power: The Global Navy", Proceedings ,
January 1984, pp 30-33. (Alternative views of the Navy's
"missions" by two officers who later contributed to the Maritime
Strategy's development. Also see "Commentary", Armed Forces anc
Society , Summer 1982, pp 682-684 for official Navy response to
Williams on the eve of Maritime Strategy development, and
Williams's rejoinder. Williams's updated views are in "The U.S
and Soviet Navies: Missions and Forces", Armed Forces and
Society, Summer 1984, pp 507-528).
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Moodie, Michael, and Cottrell, Alvin J., Geopolitics and
Maritime Power
, Beverly Hills: Sage, 1981. (A good example of
a "hedging" focus. Regards Lehman's "major change" as not
enough. Also wants greater naval activity in the Caribbean,
periodic visits to the South Atlantic, an enhanced fleet in the
Western Pacific, and continuing large-scale activity in the
Indian Ocean. See also Sea Plan 2000 , cited in Section X above).
Froggett, CDR S.J., "The Maritime Strategy: Tomahawk's Role",
Proceedings
, February 1987, PP 51-54; Williams, RADM J.W., Jr.,
"In My view ... Cross Training", Naval War College Review
,
March-April 1985, pp 96-97; and Chipman, Dr. Donald D., and Lay,
MAJ David, USAF, "Sea Power and the B-52 Stratofortress " , Air
University Review , January-February 1986, pp 45-50. (Good
examples of the "technology" approach to strategy. Focus is on
one system—in these cases the cruise missile, the nuclear
submarine, and the land-based heavy bomber— and arguments on
strategy are built around it. But c_f Taylor, Philip A.,
"Technologies and Strategies: Trends in Naval Strategies and
Tactics", Naval Forces , VI/1986, pp 44-55. ("The consensus
among senior military officers is that ... technology ... has
not, nor is it likely to determine military strategy").
** Ullman, CDR Harlan K., USN (Ret.), "Gramm-Rudraan: A Fiscal
Pearl Harbour", Naval Forces , 11/1986, pp 10-11. (Congressional
budget actions seen as potentially disastrous for both the
600-ship Navy and the Maritime Strategy. Exhibits all the
pitfalls of a solely "fiscal" approach). See also Ullman,
Harlan, U.S. Conventional Force Structure at a Crossroads
,
Washington: Georgetown University CSIS, 1985; and the annual
volumes issued by the Brookings Institution and the Committee
for National Security, cited in Sections I-III above.
Neustadt, Richard E. and May, Ernest R., Thinking in Time: The
Uses of History for Decision-Makers , New York: The Free Press,
1986. (Seeks to focus decision-makers/users of the "historical"
approach. Has direct relevance for strategists, a sub-category
of "decision- makers". For example, the "cases" highlighted in
Section VIII of this addendum and in its predecessor — The
Crimea, Salonika, the Russian Intervention, World War II, etc.





XII. MAKERS OF MODERN NAVAL STRATEGY: PEOPLE AND INSTITUTIONS
The Maritime Strategy was originally drafted primarily—although
certainly not exclusi vely--by U.S. naval officers for U.S. naval
officers. Not only were agreed national, joint, and allied
intelligence estimates and concepts of operations utilized as
fundamental "building blocks", but great importance was also
attached to long-held views of the U.S. Navy and Marine Corps
leadership, to the concepts of operations of the fleet
commanders-in-chief, and to the views of thinkers in uniform (active
duty and reserve) at the Naval War College and the Center for Naval
Analyses
.
Much of what is in the Maritime Strategy is hardly new, and
would be especially recognizable to naval officers who developed
U.S. and allied naval warfighting concepts in the late 1940s and
1950s. Likewise, elements from key strategy products of naval
officers and civilian thinkers of the late 1970s—e.g. the 1976
National Security Council Maritime Strategy study, naval reservist
John Lehman's 1978 Aircraft Carriers , and the Navy's 1978 Sea Plan
2000 and Strategic Concepts of the U.S. Navy (NWP 1 (Rev. A) )—are
also evident in the Maritime Strategy of the 1980s.
Much of what i_s new in the Maritime Strategy is the linked,
coherent discussion of (a) global warfare—rather than separate
service and theater operations; TBI warfare tasks—e.g.
anti-submarine, anti-air, anti-surface, strike, amphibious, mine and
special warfare--rather than traditional "platforms" or "unions";
(c) the specific geopolitical problems facing the U.S. Navy— and
other maritime elements—of the 1980s; and (d) the current
conventional wisdom regarding Soviet Navy capabilities and
intentions. This approach was largely driven by the primacy of the
need for the Strategy to satisfy current global operational
requirements of fleet and other force commanders, over the future
requirements of competing bureaucracies in Washington. Its effect
in fostering common reference points for all portions of the
contemporary officer corps, especially junior officers, is already
being felt.
While much of the robustness of the Maritime Strategy derives
irom its roots throughout the U.S. Navy and Marine Corps and
elsewhere, both over space and over time, it owes a high degree of
its current utility to its initial approval and promulgation by
successive Chiefs of Naval Operations in Washington and to its
codification by their staffs (OPNAV). These include especially the
successive Deputy Chiefs of Naval Operations for Plans, Policy and
Operations (OP-06), Directors of the Strategy, Plans and Policy
Division (OP-60), Heads of the Strategic Concepts Branch (OP-603),
and staff officers in that branch. OPNAV is the one organization
tasked to focus on maritime strategy, and to view it not only in a
balanced global manner but also within the bounds of actual current
national military planning parameters.
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OPNAV's capabilities in this endeavor are due in part to the
existence of the Navy Politico-Military/Strategic Planning
subspecialty education, screening, and utilization system. This
personnel system, while somewhat imperfect, has been identifying,
training, and using naval officers in a network of strategists--!
n
Washington, Newport, the Fleet, and elsewhere—for over a decade aru
a half.
Nevertheless, despite the clear postwar historical roots of the
Maritime Strategy and its codification in and dissemination from
Washington by some of the best minds in the national security
affairs community today, a number of publications appeared in the
last decade decrying a lack of strategic training and thinking in
the Navy, past and present, and ignoring or misunderstanding the
critical role in strategy development of naval officers in staff
positions. This literature, as well as some counters to it, is
briefly outlined below.
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A. The Public Debate; Criticisms and Kudos
Brooks, Captain Linton F. , "An Examination of Professional
Concerns of Naval Officers as Reflected in their Professional
Journal", Naval War College Review , Jan-Feb 1980, pp 46-56. (A
future primary contributor to the development and articulation
of the Maritime Strategy decries the paucity of articles on
strategy in the Navy professional literature of the late 1960s.
This era was admittedly dominated by Vietnam and an internal
professional view of the navy as primarily an infinitely
flexible limited war fire brigade, but it did, however, also see
the publication of RADM J. C. Wylie's Military Strategy , RADM
Henry Eccles's Military Concepts and Philosophy , and ADM Joseph
J. Clark's coauthored Sea Power and its Meaning ).
Buell, CDR Thomas B., USN (Ret.), "The Education of a Warrior",
Proceedings
, January 1981, pp 40-45. Also "Comment and
Discussion": February 1981, p 21; March 1981, p 15; April 1981,
pp 21-23; June 1981, pp 77-79; July 1981, pp 78-80; August 1981,
pp 71-75; November 1981, pp 84-87; January 1982, p 76; March
1982, p 27; April 1982, p 20. (Posed the question: "Where will
we get our future strategists?" Implied that the Navy had no
real answer to the question, a view shared by most of the eight
"commenters and discussants" chosen for publication by the
Proceedings , only one of whom was familiar with actual Navy
practice in this area. Illustrative of the limited public
visibility of true U.S. Navy strategic thought before 1981-82).
Woolsey, R. James, "Mapping 'U.S. Defense Policy in the
1980 's'", International Security , Fall 1981, pp 202-207. (By
the 1977-1980 Under Secretary of the Navy. "The other side of
the coin". A call to bring the "American academic intellectual
establishment" and the military establishment more in touch with
each other by focusing the efforts of the former on the actual
"defense policy" problems of the latter, vice exclusively on
"(a) the politico-military situation in the four corners of the
globe and (b) nuclear and arms control theology"). For similar
disconnects that have occurred even within the field of "nuclear
theology" itself, see Rosenberg, David, "U.S. Nuclear Strategy:
Theory vs. Practice", Bulletin of the Atomic Scientists , March
1987, pp 20+. ("Theorists and consultants have had little
impact on the development of nuclear weapons policies. Rather,
stategic planning should be seen as a governmental process,




Bruins, Berend D., "Should Naval Officers Be Strategists?",
Proceedings , January 1982, pp 52-5 6. Also "Comment and
Discussion": March 1982, p 27; April 1982, p 20; May 1982, p
17. (The Proceedings throws three more retirees and an
active-duty non-strategist into the public fray. Meanwhile,
fleet plans staffs, the Strategic Studies Group at Newport, and
the one intelligence officer and nine line officers—six with
PhDs—assigned to OP-603 were at the time actively laying the
groundwork for the Maritime Strategy. Illustrative of the
limited public visibility of actual naval strategic thinkers
before 1982-83. ).
Hanks, RADM Robert J., USN (Ret.), "Whither U.S. Naval
Strategy?", Strategic Review , Summer 1982, pp 16-22. (An
outstanding OP-60 of the 1970s challenges the U.S. Navy to
develop a coherent strategy, an activity being vigorously
pursued even as the article was published).
Leh-.., , John F., Jr., "Thinking About Strategy," Shipmate , Apri
1982, pp. 18-20. (SECNAVs charge to the officer corps.)
Kennedy, Floyd D., Jr., "Naval Strategy for the Next Century:
Resurgence of the Naval War College as the Center of Strategic
Naval Thought", National Defense , April 1983, pp 2 7-30. (Cover;
the resurgence of the Naval War College, although without
describing the linkages between that institution and the
strategic planners in Washington, through which Naval War
College thinking is actually translated into Maritime Strategy
elements). Also see 1983 Murray article cited in Section I
above.
Milsted, LCDR Charles E., Jr., "A Corps of Naval Strategists",
Masters Degree Thesis, Naval Postgraduate School, June 1983.
Based on the somewhat skewed open literature available during
this period. As with Bruins, above, "strategy" and "long-range
planning" not well differentiated. Proposed establishment of a
network of specifically educated and trained naval strategists
responsible for long-range planning. Following his own model,
Milsted was subsequently assigned to OP-603 from 1983 to 1985,
where he became a key contributor to the codification of the
Maritime Strategy. Cf_ U.S. Navy, First Annual Long Range
Planners' Conference cited in Section I above).
Hattendorf, John, Sailors and Scholars: The Centennial History
of the U. S. Naval War College , Newport, RI : Naval War Colege
Press, 1984. (Chronicles the important supporting role of the
Naval War College in the development and dissemination of U. S.




Crackel, LTCOL Theodore J., USA (Ret.), "On the Making of
Lieutenants and Colonels", Public Interest , Summer 1984, pp
18-30. ("The services have produced no strategic thinkers at
all." He*-is especially hard on War College faculties, including
the Naval War College: "None of the war college faculties is in
the forefront of development in any of the military disciplines
they teach." Actually, no group has been more in the "forefront
of development" in the "discipline" of Maritime Strategy
(SECNAV, the CNO, the OP-06 organization, and the Strategic
Studies Group aside) than the Naval War College faculty, as is
evidenced by their prominence in this bibliography. Crackel is
a military historian by training with little apparent experience
in actual strategy- or policy-making, and with an almost
exclusively U.S. Army-oriented academic and operational record.
Unlike most practicing U.S. naval strategists, he has apparently
self-fulfilled his prophecy and "discovered that the think-tanks
in and around Washington are a more congenial environment").
"413 Named as Proven Subspecialists", Navy Times , September 9,
1985, p 58. (The Navy system for identifying the "pool" of
naval strategists. Results of the seventh biennial U.S. Navy
selection board that identifies "proven" subspecialists for
further mid- and high-level assignments in the eight fields of
naval Political-Military/Strategic Planning. Earlier lists
appeared in Navy Times back into the 1970s. Includes many of
the builders of the Maritime Strategy. Note that these names
constitute not only the "Corps of Naval Strategists", but also
the Navy's Politico-Military and Regional Affairs experts).
** Stavridis, LCDR Jim, "An Ocean Away: Outreach from the Naval
War College", Shipmate , November 1985, p 8. (On the role of the
Naval War College in contributing to OP-603's codification of
the Maritime Strategy, and in "getting the word out" to
mid-grade naval officers. By a former OP-603 member).
* Marryott, RADM Ronald F., "President's Notes", Naval War College
Review , Nov-Dec 1985, pp 2-4. (By the 1985-86 President of the"
Naval War College and 1983-84 Director of Strategy, Plans, and
Policy (OP-60), the Navy's principal global strategist. On
development of the Maritime Strategy, and the Naval War
College's vital supporting contribution).
** CNA Annual Report: 1985 , Alexandria, VA: Center for Naval
Analyses, 1986, especially pp 7-12 and 29-30. (On CNA's
contribution to the development of the Maritime Strategy and on
its use of that strategy in planning its research programs.
Also, CNA analysts' views on Soviet maritime strategy).
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Davis, CAPT Vincent, USNR (Ret.), "Decision Making, Decision
Makers, and Some of the Results", in Cimbala, Stephen, (ed. )
,
The Reagan Defense Program; An Interim Assessment , Wilmington
DE: Scholarly Resources, 1986, pp 23-62. (A somewhat
anachronistic characterization of the contemporary Navy as one
with "too few thinkers", riven by acrimonious debates among
factions of naval officers. "Rancorous disputes simmer among
its 'big three unions' —the carrier, submarine, and
surface-warfare admirals". Thus the seminal thinker and writer
on naval strategy and bureaucratic politics of the 40s, 50s, and
60s sees no essential change in the Navy of the mid-80s, --
despite conscious Navy efforts to take his earlier counsel to
heart in its development of a transcendent Maritime Strategy.
Cf articles by VADMs Demars, Schoultz, and Dunn— leaders of the
submarine and air warfare communities—and by LTs Winnefeld,
Peppe and Keller—the rising generation—cited in Sections II
and III above).
Bush, Ted, "Libyan Exercise Exemplifies New Navy Strategy", Navy
Times , February 10, 1986, pp 45-46. (OPNAV strategists
illuminate a variety of aspects of the Maritime Strategy and its
origins. Note that, unlike open-literature authors, actual
practicing strategists usually remain nameless to the general
public. This hardly means, however, that they are somehow less
important )
.
** Leibstone, Marvin, "US Report", Naval Forces , 11/1986, p 94.
Alleges "an unusually large number of naval officers do not
recognize fully the switch from 'defense' to 'offense* that the
Navy's high command believes is necessary". But cf_ "The United
States Navy: On the Crest of the Wave", The Economist , April
19, 1986, p 49 cited above: "What is certain is that an entire
generation of junior and middle-grade naval officers now
believes that the first wartime job of the navy would be to sai!
north and fight the Russians close to their bases".
** Burdick, CAPT Howard, "Sons of the Prophet: A View of the Navai
War College Faculty", Naval War College Review , May-June 1986,
pp 81-89. (On the Naval War College, its faculty, and the
Maritime Strategy, by the Dean of Academics at the Naval War
College)
.
** Wirt, Robert T. , "Strategic ASW", Submarine Review , July 1986,
pp 50-56. (Calls for a comprehensive ASW plan, driven by
submariners, to support the Maritime Strategy. Unionism is not
quite dead yet).
** Metcalf, VADM Joseph, "Metcalf Speaks Out: On the Navy's New
Offense, Ship Design and Archimedes", Navy News and Undersea
Technology , July 18, 1986, p 2. (The Deputy Chief of Naval
Operations for Surface Warfare views Maritime Strategy as of
little concern to Navy junior officers. Not a common view).
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** Gallotta, CAPT Richard USN (Ret) et al , Assessment of Maritime
Strategy Education and Training in the Department of the Navy .
McLean VA: The BDM Corporation, December 31, 1986. (A
comprehensive balanced survey, with recommendations).
Murray, Williamson, "Grading the War Colleges", National
Interest , Winter 1986/7, pp 12-19. (Antidote to Crackel. "The
best of the war colleges, the Naval War College at Newport, sets
the standard by which the other war colleges should be
measured." "The strategy and policy curriculum has justifiably
acquired a reputation as the premier course in the United
States, if not the Western world, for the examination of
strategy. So high is the Naval War College's reputation, that
over the course of the past few years it has attracted a number
of the best young military historians and political scientists
in national security affairs to Newport.").
** Clark, Charles S. , "In Person: Fred H. Rainbow: Charting a
Course for the Navy '^ Debates", National Journal , February 21,
1987, p 435. (On the role of the Proceedings in orchestrating
"some heated forensics over the Navy ' s trumpeted Maritime
Strategy (while) similar Air Force and Army journals often
reflect the blandness of official restraints". The Institute
has come a long way in just a few short years. Like the Naval
War College and the Naval War College Review , the Naval
Institute and the Proceedings are clearly at the cutting edge of
maritime strategy debate today).
** Tritten, CDR James, "New Directions," Naval War College Review ,
Spring 1987, p. 94. (By the Chairman of the Naval Postgraduate
School National Security Affairs Department and a former OP-60
staffer. On the revi talization of naval history and strategy
studies at the "PG School").
** Hearding, LCDR David, "A Requiem for the Silent Service",
Submarine Review , July 1987, pp 73-78. (An important article,
stressing the need for broader integration of U.S. Navy
submarine officers into the Navy as a whole, in part as a result
of the advent of the Maritime Strategy).
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B. The Public Record: OP-603
From 1982- to the present, the primary U.S. Navy organization
charged with codifying, refining, and articulating the consensus in
the Navy regarding the Maritime Strategy has been the OPNAV
Strategic Concepts Group (OP-603). Organized by VADM William J.
Crowe (then OP-06) and RADM Robert Hilton (then OP-60) in 197 8,
OP-603 evolved into an office of about a dozen post-graduate
educated, trained, professional operator - strategists, including
U.S. Army, Air Force, Marine Corps and Central Intelligence Agency
officers.
Almost invisible to the general and national security affairs
academic publics—especially when contrasted to the Secretary of the
Navy, the Chief of Naval Operations, OP-06 and OP-60, the
operational commanders, the Strategic Studies Group and the Naval
War College—these officers have nevertheless been those principally
responsible for the development of the Maritime Strategy as a
unified, coherent, global framework and common U.S. and allied naval
v
•.£; ion.
As with war planners, but unlike war college faculties, their
output is largely classified. Nevertheless, they—and their
superiors, OP-60 and OP-60B— have often also achieved respectable
open publication records. Typically, their writings prior to
assignment to OP-60/ 603 reflect their diverse operational and
academic interests and achievements; their publications during and
after their assignment as strategists usually reflect their work on
the Maritime Strategy. (For the latter, see the entries cited
earlier in this bibliography by RADMs Hanks, Marryott, and Pendley;
CAPTs Barnett, Brooks, Johnson, McGruther, and Swartz; CDRs Hickman,
Kalb, and Milsted; and LCDRs Pocalyko and Stavridis. For the
former, see the entries below. They represent, admittedly, only a
portion of the record, limited only to the products of those
officers who were speci fically and principally assigned to codify
the Maritime Strategy, generally the OP-603 "Branch Heads" and
"Maritime Strategy Action Officers" serving from 1982 through 1986.
They are provided only to illustrate the breadth of experience and
depth of thought members of the U.S. Navy's current, functioning
"Corps of Naval Strategists" bring with them when they report for
duty)
.
Weeks, LCDR Stanley B., "United States Defense Policy Toward
Spain, 1950-1976, unpublished PhD dissertation, American
University, 1977; and Johnson, LCDR William S., "Naval Diplomacy
and the Failure of Balanced Security in the Far East —
1921-1935, and "Defense Budget Constraints and the Fate of the
Carrier in the Royal Navy", Navy War College Review , February
1972, pp 67-88 and May-June 1973, pp 12-30. (Operators and
international relations specialists as future strategists. By
the OP-60 co-drafters of the initial 1982-1983 U.S. Navy
Maritime Strategy briefings and testimony).
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Barnett, CAPT Roger W., "Soviet Strategic Reserves and the
Soviet Navy", in Currie, MAJ Kenneth M. and Varhall, MAJ
Gregory, "The Soviet Union: What Lies Ahead? Military Political
Affairs in the 1980s , Washington: USGPO, 1985, pp 581-605.
(The operator and Sovietologist as future strategist. A 1980
paper by the 1983-84 OP-603 Branch Head). See also his "Their
Professional Journal" (with Dr. Edward J. Lacey), Proceedings ,
October 1982, pp 95-101.
Seaquist, CDR Larry, "Memorandum for the Commander. Subject:
Tactical Proficiency", and "Tactics to Improve Tactical
Proficiency", Proceedings , July 1981, pp 58-61 and February
1983, pp 3 7-42. (The operator and tactician as future
strategist. By a member of the 1983-84 Strategic Studies Group
and 1984-85 OP-603 Branch Head).
Parker, LCDR T. Wood, "Thinking Offensively", Proceedings , April
1981, pp 26-31; "Theater Nuclear Warfare and the U.S. Navy",
Naval War College Review , Jan-Feb 1982, pp 3-16; and "Paradigms,
Convent ? ^-al Wisdom, and Navai. warfare", Proceedings , April
1983, pp 29-35. (The operator and War College student as future
strategist. Three prize-winning essays by the 1984-85 principal
OP-603 Maritime Strategy Action Officer).
Daly, CAPT Thomas M. and Myers, CDR Albert C. , "The Art of ASW",
Proceedings , October 1985, pp 164-165. (Operators and warfare
specialists as strategists. The 1985-86 OP-603 Branch Head and
his primary Maritime Strategy Action Officer discuss their
primary warfare specialty. See also Daly Proceedings articles
on the I ran- Iraq War, July 1984 and May and July 1985, and on
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